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INTRODUCTION
During a set of interviews in 1976, former President Richard Nixon
maintained that only the president's judgment could fix the dividing line
between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct when national
security is at issue: when "the President does it, that means that it is not
illegal."' Now, in the 1990s, executives from an eclectic combination of
nations - Russia, Germany, Venezuela, and Brazil, among others
are claiming extraordinary powers.2 As radical and out of step with
constitutional norms as Nixon's statement and claims by these national
leaders are, they also mesh with the views of most recent presidents of
Argentina and the United States and reflect the growth of presidential
emergency powers in these two nations.
Consider the following examples:
1) An executive agency compiled computer files on thousands of
citizens involved in a protest movement, infiltrated organizations,
opened mail, collected non-public information on activists, and. moni-
tored international phone, telegraph, and radio traffic involving these
1. Excerpts From Nixon's Responses to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1976, at A16 (quoting President Richard M. Nixon discussing national
security concerns).
2. See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Kohl's 'Emergency' Suggestion Raises Questions, Draws
Criticism, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1992, at A 16 (assessing efforts by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to
take probable extra-constitutional measures to combat the influx of refugees into Germany);
Serge Schmemann, Russia's Parliament Hesitates Between Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1992, at E2 (describing threats by President Boris Yeltsin to seize additional powers
unconstitutionally in Russia); Ken Silverstein, Marketing Misery in Latin America, THE
NATION, Dec. 21, 1992, at 766 (detailing excesses by executives in Brazil, Argentina,
Mexico, and Venezuela).
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people and groups. When the targets of surveillance sued the govern-
ment for violating constitutional rights, the executive admitted that at
least some of the plaintiffs were targets of the surveillance, but it suc-
cessfully stopped the lawsuit by refusing to reveal data concerning the
details of the surveillance, claiming that disclosure would seriously
injure the national security.3
2) When high inflation and dwindling bank reserves threatened the
national economy, the executive declared a freeze on bank customer
savings withdrawals. The government summarily seized depositors'
currency and in its place, provided depositors with government bonds,
whose weak market value and exchange restrictions. effectively robbed
millions of citizens of their life savings
3) A statute granted the president discretion in emergency conditions
to detain anyone whom the government believed planned to engage in
espionage or sabotage. Detention centers were created, where detainees
could either await the end of the emergency or seek release through
administrative proceedings. Detainees were not entitled to a judicial
trial.'
4) During a period of internal strife, military officials arrested and
imprisoned civilians for various crimes alleged to have contributed to
the insurrection then being combatted by the national government and
its military. The civilians were denied civilian trials and the constitu-
tional protections afforded those accused of crimes. When the accused
sought redress in the civilian courts, the military successfully argued that
emergency conditions required military detention and trials and that in
difficult times, constitutional rights must be subordinated to the need for
order.6
Without identifying the actors and places, it is not easy to place
these incidents in Argentina or the United States. That is, of course, the
point of the examples and an important part of the message that this
article seeks to convey - that to an extent few would have considered
possible in earlier times, Argentina and the United States have in com-
mon an executive branch whose excessive reliance on self-described
emergency conditions to justify extraordinary powers has contributed to
the creation of practically monarchical presidencies.
Despite important differences in history and traditions, Argentina
and the United States each adopted a presidentialist system and then
3. See infra text accompanying notes 280-83.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 207-11.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 252-60.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 160-62.
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limited the president's constitutional powers, only to have those restric-
tions abused and often ignored in the last century through actions justi-
fied as necessary responses to emergency conditions. While presidents
of both countries have frequently acted unilaterally, the judicial and
legislative branches have also contributed to the ascendant presidencies.
Over time, the legislatures of both countries have become close to
impotent, calling into question the efficacy of the separation of powers
and of the presidential systems.7 Instead of performing their constitution-
ally assigned role of checking executive abuses and protecting individual
rights, the congresses and courts often have acquiesced in lawless presi-
dential action, and at times have authorized or upheld presidential emer-
gency powers.
This comparative examination of presidential emergency powers in
Argentina and the United States confirms Justice Jackson's warning that
emergency powers ... tend to kindle emergencies. As presidents
have accrued ever greater discretion to act outside the bounds of rules
for "ordinary" times, presidents who wish to act aggressively in imple-
menting personal policy goals have found "emergency" conditions a
convenient path for their actions. Unfortunately, excesses in the exercise
of presidential emergency powers have exacerbated the growing disre-
spect that our citizens have for their governments and laws.9
Our constitutions could not have anticipated the growth in the real
powers of the modern presidency in either Argentina or the United
States. While constitutional changes may be needed in Argentina to
control the excessive use of emergency powers by the president, a better
strategy for strengthened constitutional government in both nations is to
turn to the congresses and courts and seek structural and institutional
change which would provide these two branches with the means for
curbing executive power.
This article offers three comparative insights. First, it concludes that
comparative inquiries into presidential systems may be useful for those
interested in constitutional government, regardless of historical, cultural,
or other contextual differences among nations. Thus, nations with
7. See generally Fred W. Riggs, The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-
constitutional Practices, 9 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 247, 252 (1988); Juan J. Linz, The Perils of
Presidentialism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 51.
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
9. See Julia Preston, Latin Americans Protest Corruption, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1992,
at A 1l; Peter Alsberg, Children Seen Losing Trust in Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
1992, at A13; GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION 1991, at 212
(1992) (survey on confidence in institutions); see also infra text accompanying notes 362-64.
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presidentialist constitutional systems may have common problems
because of the institutional presidency. The article maintains that our
presidential systems are in such states of disrepair that a fundamental
reinvigoration of the legislative and judicial branches is required, so that
government may better serve important constitutional values in our
nations.
Second, the ethnocentric claim of many constitutionalists that the
United States and its Constitution serve as the ideal model for a consti-
tutional government is a myth which Argentina should reject. While
separation of powers theory promises adequate checks on presidential
power in the United States, constitutional practice is increasingly prov-
ing the theoretical protections woefully inadequate. It may be that some
of the structural features of presidential systems - fixed terms of office,
opportunities to veto legislation, powers to act independently of an
elected legislature - contribute to the excessive exercise of emergency
powers and are gradually undermining constitutional government in the
United States. To the extent that Argentina has not shared some of the
ameliorating conditions which have contributed to insuring more stable
constitutional rule in the United States - a tradition of respect for the
Constitution and laws, an independent judiciary, and an electoral and
party system which encourages compromise and facilitates presidential
leadership - the presidential system as currently structured may not
support effective democratic self-government in Argentina. I" Instead,
Argentina should seek reforms for its unique problems, changes which
will make another cycle of repression and lawlessness less likely.
Third, this article teaches that those concerned about the future of
accountable constitutional government in the United States can learn
something from the Argentine experience. Argentina's decades of re-
pression under centralized power suggest that the trend toward relatively
unchecked and expansive presidential emergency powers in the United
States could provide the context for the extreme abuses of executive
powers which have caused so much harm in Argentina.
In Part I, the article briefly revisits each nation's preconstitutional
history and framing period as they bear upon the development of execu-
tive power. Important differences in history, tradition, and philosophical
influences, along with different settlement patterns, contributed to mark-
edly differing conceptions about emergency powers in framing the
constitutions of Argentina and the United States. In response to its past,
Argentina created a stronger president vested with a greater degree of
10. See Riggs, supra note 7, at 247; Linz, supra note 7, at 51-52 (claiming that
parliamentarianism "is more conducive to stable democracy" than a presidential system).
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discretion. However, each nation embarked upon its future with a firm
commitment to constitutional government and the rule of law.
Part II traces the evolution of presidential emergency powers in the
nineteenth century. In both countries, until about the turn of the century,
emergency powers were infrequently exercised and were generally either
invoked with advance legislative approval or were concededly illegal but
later justified as necessary under exigent circumstances.
In Part III, examples of the exercise of emergency powers are used
to show how the respect for constitutional limits broke down in the
twentieth century, aided by subservient congresses and courts and ag-
gressive presidents. Although the causes and effects of excessive reli-
ance on emergency powers differ in Argentina and the United States,
perceived threats to the national security highlight the common trend
toward greater presidential powers. Part III also examines, in the context
of these examples, how our nations' institutions have failed in the task
of controlling an arbitrary executive. It demonstrates that, with a few
important exceptions, the norm for the courts and legislatures in Argen-
tina and the United States has been abdication to the executive branch,
either through active support or through inaction.
Finally, Part IV concludes that excessive exercise of presidential
emergency powers is damaging the commitment to constitutional gov-
ernment in both nations and is lessening the respect held by the citizens
for their governments and laws. The article also recommends funda-
mental systemic changes and mechanisms which may produce effective
statutory controls on presidential actions, and judicial review to secure
obedience to the rule of law."1
11. We offer a brief justification for comparing Argentina and the United States to the
same set of standards. No one would claim that constitutional government or the rule of law
or democracy has been a "way of life" in Argentina in a way that many would claim has
existed in the United States. Nor is it necessarily the case that Argentines seek any or all of
these European ideals which, of course, have strikingly different features as they have been
implemented in the nations of Western Europe and in the United States. See generally
Richard Rose, The Job at the Top: The Presidency in Comparative Perspective, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 3 (George C. Edwards III et al. eds., 1985).
However, in most important respects, the Argentines say that they want and expect a constitu-
tional democracy based on the rule of law. The Argentine Constitution emulates that of the
United States in important ways, as we will discuss further below. Many Argentine leaders
have sought to establish fully a European version of democracy, and a struggle to establish
effectively functioning constitutional institutions is ongoing in Argentina today. DANIEL
PONEMAN, ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL xiv (1987).
Another reason for, comparing Argentine and U.S. constitutional developments is the
traditionally high respect that the Argentine Supreme Court has paid to American constitution-
al law. For instance, in Judgment of Dec. 7, 1934 (Avico v. de la Pesa), Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 172 Fallos 37 (Arg.), analyzing the
extent of the constitutional right to own property, the Argentine Supreme Court said:
(Vol. 15:1
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I. PRECONSTITUTIONAL AND FRAMING HISTORY
This Part reviews the historical contexts for the exercise of presiden-
tial emergency powers in Argentina and the United States. Section A
considers preconstitutional history, philosophical influences, and tradi-
tions bearing upon the development of emergency powers and the
presidency. Section B briefly examines each constitution and its framing




Spanish and particularly Castillian culture dominated the early
settlement trends in what is now Argentina. The strong, authoritarian,
and royal central government; the weak and ineffectual parliament; the
strong and authoritarian church; the inexperience with any idea of
shared or balanced powers in government; and the idea that individuals
did not require freedoms from the government because they would be
protected by the government, all typified Castillian society and its early
migration to the Americas. 12 The leadership of Castile, exercised by a
succession of energetic monarchs - Isabella and Ferdinand, Charles V,
and Philip II - effectively curtailed challenges from the elected parlia-
ment and from the aristocracy. 3 The old European values held firm in
Spain and in colonial Argentina, even as nations to the European north
were experiencing rapid changes in society and public life. 14 However,
by the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish monarchy was collaps-
ing and along with it, effective control over its colony in Argentina was
diminishing. After fighting off invasions of Buenos Aires by the British
Our Constitution, by adopting to a great extent the principles of the Constitution of
the United States, has given us, among other things, the immense advantage of the
wise interpretation of their (U.S.] Supreme Court relative to the principles we have
incorporated.... It is, therefore, of great interest to study how the Supreme Court
of that country has interpreted the nature, extent and limits of that [constitutional]
right.
Id. at 40-41.
Finally, it has been suggested that the similarities among presidential constitutional
systems may offer comparative insights, notwithstanding historical, cultural, and other
differences between our nations. Riggs, supra note 7, at 272.
12. ROBERT D. CRASSWELLER, PER6N AND THE ENIGMAS OF ARGENTINA 22-27 (1988).
13. See id. at 24-25.
14. Id. at 26.
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in 1806 and 1807, and battling Spanish troops between 1811 and 1815,
the Argentines moved toward a declaration of independence in 1816.15
As the Argentine nation took shape during the nineteenth century,
the inherited Spanish institution of strong and authoritarian central
executive rule was widely absorbed by the Creole leaders, though it was
modified to permit the Creoles to distance themselves from the peninsu-
lar Spaniards. As the Crown had entrusted colonial government exclu-
sively to Spanish officials, the excluded Creoles felt frustration and
distrust of the Spanish-born as they moved away from Buenos Aires,
where they could escape witness to their different status.' 6 Although this
initial rift was between Spanish-born and native-born Creoles as they
competed for superiority in the colonial system to the exclusion of
Indians, Blacks, and Mestizos, gradual racial intermixing broadened the
term "creole" to include all mixes and all native-born people. As the
Spaniards were set apart from the native-born Creoles, so too were the
city (Buenos Aires) and country divided. 7
The 1810 Men of May movement, for example, sprang from Buenos
Aires and sought to further the cause of Argentine independence. The
Men of May emulated the latest European ideas, including those of
Rousseau, in theorizing a centralized government based on liberal Euro-
pean principles. Those from the interior were in many respects opposed
to everything advocated by the Men of May - everything except
independence. The so-called "Great Rift"'8 was thus born: urban versus
rural values, aristocrats versus commoners, Buenos Aires versus the
interior, and liberal monarchy versus populist federalism.' 9
The two groups were, by tradition, intolerant and uncompromising.
From 1827 until 1852, the nativists dominated, as the Men of May
movement and its leaders were unable to heal the growing rift. Thus
was born the first caudillo - "the provincial leader of the common
people who ruled by physical and psychological prowess." 20 According
to Nicolas Shumway, Juan Manuel de Rosas became the first ruler of
Argentina by disavowing whatever was foreign or modern, while perse-
cuting the Men of May followers into destruction or exile. Although
15. Id. at 32-33; see also FREDERICK A. KIRKPATRICK, A HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE
REPUBLIC 75-103 (1931).
16. CRASSWELLER, supra note 12, at 35-36.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id. at 37.
20. Id.; Eduardo Galeano has written that a caudillo "is like a magnet: he lives to the
extent that he attracts." EDUARDO GALEANO, WE SAY No: CHRONICLES 1963-1991, at 55
(1992).
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Rosas formally governed only the Buenos Aires province, he in fact
ruled all of Argentina. The terms of his appointment as governor in
1829, sanctioned by the provincial legislature, gave Rosas extraordinary
powers for three years.2 ' Although Rosas brought order out of the
anarchic conditions that existed prior to his term, according to
Shumway, he "restricted the press, neglected education, supported the
conservative clergy, strengthened the army, and muzzled critics.
'22
When he returned for a second term in 1835, beckoned by provincial
leaders to reassert control over the province lost during his absence,
Rosas demanded even more power and, with the acquiescence of the
legislature, became a virtual dictator who dominated Argentine politics
for seventeen more years.23
Rosas' government was a loose federation in -form, where provinces
had local caudillos, each under the de facto control of Rosas. 24 Dispens-
ing with elections, Rosas remained in power by periodically submitting
his resignation to a hand-picked congress, which dutifully. refused his
offer and begged him to continue for another term. In some ways Rosas
was a classic caudillo, although his constituency included the conserva-
tive owners of the estancias, who supporited him because of his policies
of taking land from the Indians and keeping the market for beef and
hides strong.25 Although the union was preserved in this loose confeder-
ation form until 1852, when Rosas was defeated in battle by military
leaders, the nation remained deeply divided.
By the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina had become a nation, but
it was an unusual union, producing what has been called "a society of
opposers. '26 Contrary to caudillo ideals, Rosas was reportedly aristocratic
and opposed to federal rule and democracy. It was likely the Men of
May and their high-minded 'ideas of Argentina that were the most
responsible for the pre-constitutional mindset in the nation; their ideals
were exclusionary, not inclusive, divisive and not conciliatory. 28 Among
all the divisions which became apparent in the first half of the nineteenth
century, just about the only point upon which the competing dominant
groups agreed was that strong leaders were good and necessary.29
21. NICOLAS SHUMWAY, THE INVENTION OF ARGENTINA 117-20 (1991).
22. Id. at 117.
23. Id. at 118-19; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 145-59.
24. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 143.
25. SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 118.
26. Id. at x (quoting novelist Ernesto Sabato).
27. Id. at 119-20.
28. Id. at x-xi.
29. Cf. id. at 294 ("Argentine nationalism is impatient. It wants powerful leaders with
quick fixes and fast cures.").
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2. United States
In contrast to the Castillian ideal of the all-powerful monarch and to
the Argentine caudillo, the European liberal tradition bequeathed a
vision of leadership to the North American colonists steeped in the rule
of law. Liberal constitutional thought in the eighteenth century separated
lawful from lawless government by simply positing a boundary line:
"separate spheres of emergency versus non-emergency governance.' 30 It
was a cardinal feature of liberal political thought that law provided all
the rules for governance, except when necessity made playing by the
rules impossible.3 1 Nonetheless, the idea of extraordinary or emergency
powers has been a feature of European liberalism at least since the time
of John Locke. Through the doctrine of prerogative, Locke's theory
vested in the executive the power to respond to "necessities," where
expedience demanded that action be taken before a cumbersome and
slow legislative process could be completed.32 Fundamental to Locke's
version of executive emergency powers was their extra-legal character.
The prerogative was to act "according to discretion, for the publick [sic]
good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against
icY33it.
' 3
Relying upon the European liberal tradition, the key predicate for
the exercise of emergency powers in the North American colonies
became exigency, the pressure of time. In general, the colonists abhorred
the authoritarianism of King George and thus sought legal limits on
executive power. However, because written law could not provide the
limits on actions taken in times of emergency, it was argued that gov-
ernments and their people had to look to the idea of representation for
protection against arbitrary rule. According to Edmund Burke, represen-
tatives of the people serve as their "trustees" and must be permitted at
times to act independently of the control of their constituency and of
30. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1389 (1989).
31. See generally Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the
Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736 (1978).
32. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 159-160 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1970).
33. Id. Rousseau also recognized a need for such extra-legal recourse: "If... the peril is
of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the
method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws ...... JEAN J. Rous-
SEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 124 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950). The Men of
May movement in Argentina looked to Rousseau in particular for the philosophical basis for
a modern and liberal Argentine state. See supra text accompanying note 18 (assessing Men of
May movement).
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their laws.34 What had not been settled at the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, however, was the nature of the executive that
would be permitted to exercise these representative powers in ways that
would not threaten individual freedom or constitutional principles.35
3. Conclusions
The idea of a prerogative power for a national leader is thus pre-
and extra-constitutional. The traditions from which the Argentine and
North American conceptions of presidential prerogative spring are, to be
sure, dissimilar in many important respects. In Argentina, the idea of
prerogative emerged more by default than design, as the Great Rift
made agreement about such first principles impossible. The Men of May
and their followers would have tethered leaders to the rule of law and to
European concepts of extra-legal emergency powers,36 while the support-
ers of the caudillos sought no such niceties to justify their leaders'
exploits. The failure to bridge the Great Rift facilitated the firm estab-
lishment of prerogative powers in pre-constitutional Argentina.
In the United States, English heritage and its Lockean content are
unmistakable and dominant. In addition, the colonists, though a diverse
lot, shared a common enemy as they struggled toward nationhood, thus
encouraging consensus and compromise in a new culture whose inhabit-
ants came from places where compromise and competition among ideas
and groups were common. Unlike the Argentine colonists, the early
Americans were not accustomed to all-powerful institutions.
B. The Framing Periods and the Constitutions
1. Argentina
"The new states of formerly Spanish America need kings under the
name of presidents. 37 After Rosas was defeated in 1852 by the troops
of Justo Jos6 de Urquiza, caudillo of Entre Rios province, Urquiza was
unable to unify the country under constitutional rule. Urquiza appointed
a representative committee to draft the rules for a constitutional conven-
tion. That committee produced the Pact of San Nicolis of May 31,
34. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 164-65 (1987).
35. DANIEL P. FRANKLIN, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES: THE EXERCISE OF PREROGATIVE
POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1991).
36. See SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 156.
37. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, LAS "BASES" DE ALBERDI [THE "BASES" OF ALBERDI] 229
(Jorge M. Mayer ed., 1969) (quoting Simon Bolivar).
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1852, which provided for provincial delegate representation, made
Buenos Aires the federal capital of all Argentina, and granted Urquiza
all governmental powers until a constitutional government could be
established.3' However, the people of Buenos Aires refused to accept the
Pact. In September 1852, Buenos Aires rebelled and then seceded from
the federation.39
Meanwhile, the Men of '37, a group of young intellectuals deter-
mined to rescue Argentina from the rule of Rosas and the anarchy that
preceded it, advanced a plan for national unity. Seeking inspiration in
Juan Bautista Alberdi's Bases y puntos de partida para la organizaci6n
politica de la Reptiblica Argentina [Bases and Points of Departure for
the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic], completed in
1852, the Men of '37 hoped to develop a representative government
with democratic institutions relinquishing power to the will of the
people who had supported Rosas and his authoritarianism. 4° Alberdi
realized that the caudillo was indigenous to Argentina and that his
persisting presence demonstrated an Argentine truth: the need for a
strong executive. Alberdi wrote:
Give to the executive all the power possible. But give it to him by
means of a constitution. This kind of executive power constitutes
the dominant need in constitutional law at this time in South Amer-
ica. The attempts at monarchy, [and] the tendency ... towards
dictatorship are the best proof of the need we speak of.
4'
The Constitutional Convention contemplated by the Pact of San
Nicolis was convened in Santa FK, far from Buenos Aires. A draft
constitution was debated for ten evenings; each article was debated for
less than twelve minutes before being adopted by the Constitutional
Congress.42 The resulting Constitution of 1853 borrowed heavily from
the United States, but was also influenced by various European ideas
and by the earlier failed Argentine charters. 43 The Constitution estab-
lished a republican form of government based on principles of separa-
tion of powers and (through provincial governments) federalism, and
guaranteed a list of individual rights more extensive than those
38. SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 172.
39. Id. at 173-74.
40. Id. at 129, 132-33.
41. ALBERDI, supra note 37, at 352.
42. PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 128.
43. Segundo V. Linares Quintana, Comparison of the Constitutional Basis of the United
States and Argentine Political Systems, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 641 (1948-49); see generally
SANTOS P. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Edwin W. Patterson ed., 1943).
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embodied in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. 4 The president
and members of two houses of Congress were to be elected, and an
independent judiciary whose appointments would be made by the
president and confirmed by the Senate comprised the third branch of
government.
Despite North American influence, the Constitution retained the
Spanish emphasis on centralization of powers. The president was made
"supreme head of the Nation"4 for one six-year term, he was given
power to appoint high-ranking officials without congressional approval,46
and, patterned after the French revolutionary law of 1791 and the Chil-
ean Constitution of 1833, 47 he was granted the authority to declare a
"state of siege" and suspend constitutional rights when internal unrest
endangered the Constitution or the government.48 Under the Constitu-
tion, the power of the president to declare a state of siege is limited by
procedural protections. The president is required to obtain the Senate's
approval before declaring a state of siege in the event of foreign at-
tack;49 and only Congress is given power to declare a state of siege in
the event of internal disorder,50 except when the Congress is in recess, in
which case the president may declare a state of siege and Congress may
approve or reject the declaration when it reconvenes.5
Further, the Constitution designates siege as a temporary and excep-
tional condition, limiting the state of siege to "the Province or territory
in which the disturbance of order exists. 52 Although the Constitution is
silent concerning the time during which a state of siege imposed in
response to internal disorder is to remain in force, article 86 states that a
44. CONST. ARG. arts. 1-35.
45. Id. art. 86(10).
46. Id. art. 86(1).
47. Alejandro M. Garro, The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmen-
tal Action Under a State of Siege, 4 HuM. RTS. L.J. 311, 316-17 (1983).
48. CONST. ARG. art. 23. In France, the state of siege was legally recognized as early as
1791, but it was different from and more grave than a state of war and was directly related to
an armed attack on the territory of the nation. The Argentine framers incorporated the French
idea because they feared a continuation of the prolonged fighting which followed indepen-
dence from Spain. However, like the Chileans, the Argentines expanded the conditions which
could prompt the state of siege to include internal disorder. In addition, while French law
subordinated civilian authority to the military as necessary to repel the foreign attack, article
23 of the Argentine Constitution permits the president to suspend some or all constitutional
guarantees and does not grant any additional powers for the military. See Garro, supra note
47, at 317 n.14.
49. CONST. ARG. art. 53.
50. Id. art. 67(26).
51. Id.; see also id. art. 86(19).
52. See id. art. 23.
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state of siege caused by foreign attack may be declared "for a limited
period. 53 In addition, the president's power to arrest citizens does not
permit him to punish the accused, and he must allow a detained person
to leave Argentina if the individual so chooses.
54
To protect the new government from uprisings by local caudillo
leaders, and inspired by Alberdi, the Constitution provided in article 6
that the "the Federal Government shall have the right to intervene, with
or without the request of provincial legislatures or governors, in the
territory of any province only when necessary to re-establish public
order threatened by sedition, or to protect national security under threat
of attack or foreign danger." Although article 6 was developed from the
moribund Republican Form of Government Clause in the U.S. Constitu-
tion,55 intervention by the national government into the provinces soon
became a habit. 56 Because the executive has no constitutional obligation
to request approval from Congiess under-article 6, most interventions
have been by executive decree.57 Aside from periods of military rule, in
which the provinces have been controlled by de facto authorities ap-
pointed by the central government, there were 148 cases of federal
intervention between 1853 and 1976. Approximately 100 of those inter-
ventions were ordered by the executive acting alone. 58 In addition,
during the extended periods in which Argentina has been ruled by the
military, the president has unilaterally declared every state of siege;
Congress has been dissolved during periods of military rule.
2. United States
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress enacted the
first emergency authority for the United States in a series of resolutions
and statutes directed at conducting the war.5 9 However, at the Constitu-
tional Convention and during the ratification debates, emergency powers
53. Id. art. 86.
54. Id. arts. 6, 23.
55. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
56. CRASSWELLER, supra note 12, at 40.
57. SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 154.
58. See JONATHAN M. MILLER ET AL., 2 CONSTITucI6N Y PODER POLTICO [CONSTITU-
TION AND POLITICAL POWER] 1057 (1987).
59. See J. REUBEN CLARK, JR., EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER,
1917 DEALING WITH THE CONTROL AND TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC
USE, BENEFIT, OR WELFARE: PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF
ANALOGOUS LEGISLATION SINCE 1775, at 201-28 (1918).
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were not expressly a subject of discussion. 60 The U.S. Constitution
anticipates emergency conditions in conferring upon the House of
Representatives the power to impeach; 61 upon the Senate the power to
try impeachments; 62 upon the Congress the power to declare war,63 to
call forth the militia,64 and to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus
only in cases of rebellion or invasion when the public safety may re-
quire it;65 and upon the president the discretion to call special sessions
of Congress.6 What these provisions and the attendant lack of debate
about emergency powers reveal most is that actions not mentioned in
the Constitution but taken by the president in the name of emergency
conditions were not given constitutional approval. 67
Yet, during the framing period there were signs that the absolute
denial of presidential emergency powers did not mean that the govern-
ment as a whole lacked theoretical justification for emergency actions.
As Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist, the constitutional
power of the federal government to provide for national defense "ought
to exist without limitation: because it is impossible to foresee or define
the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the corresponding extent
and, variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them."
t
Although Hamilton was referring to the authority of the elected branches
acting in concert, presidents have misappropriated Hamilton's argument
to justify unilateral presidential emergency powers.
60. STAFF OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY POWER, 93D
CONG., IST SESS., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 5
(1973) [hereinafter BRIEF HISTORY].
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
62. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
63. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
64. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
65. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
66. Id. art. II, § 3.
67. The only emergency seriously contemplated by the framers was war. In light of their
recent experiences, the framers were determined to make war an exception, a condition which
should be difficult to undertake, only after careful deliberation. Thus, Congress was given the
authority to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal. Otherwise, only an armed
attack upon the United States would empower the president to take extraordinary measures
not expressly contemplated by the Constitution. Short of the defensive use of force or
delegation of legislative powers, the president was not given constitutional emergency powers.
See Charles Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 672, 694-700 (1972).
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton).
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II. THE DECLINE OF THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY
A. Argentina, 1853-1930
Early Argentine presidents generally acted within the limits of their
generous constitutional powers. From the beginning, however, the
presidency established its dominance over the legislative and judicial
branches of the new government. After ratification of the Constitution of
1853 in all of the provinces except Buenos Aires, Bartolom6 Mitre
fielded an army to keep the Constitution out of Buenos Aires. It became
apparent that national reconciliation would only occur on Buenos Aires'
terms.69 Mitre employed his provincial army to win the decisive Battle
of Pav6n in 1861, after which he dissolved the federal government and
proclaimed himself "head of the national executive. 7° Until he was
elected as the united nation's first president in May 1862, Mitre exer-
cised the powers of the presidency of Argentina de facto. When the
legitimacy of his rule was challenged in court, the Argentine Supreme
Court recognized for the first time the legality of a de facto president:
"[A]s governor of Buenos Aires and Commander-in-Chief of the Army
[General Mitre] had authority to rule ... since, after the Battle of
Pav6n, he provisionally exercised all the national powers, enjoyed the
popularity of a triumphant revolution, and assumed the momentous
duties victory had thrust upon him."7
After his election, Mitre sought to bridge the Great Rift by recom-
mending the federalization of Buenos Aires as the capital of Argentina
(like Washington, D.C. in the United States) and the development of a
new capital for Buenos Aires province. 72 Although he failed in his
efforts at federalizing Buenos Aires, Mitre further centralized the gov-
ernment by appointing his allies to all important posts and improving
69. Edwin Early, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, in THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 253 (Simon Collier et al. eds., 1985). At Buenos
Aires' urging, the 1853 Constitution was re-examined and important amendments, patterned
on the U.S. Constitution, were adopted in 1860. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 168.
70. See GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPOS, THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT: THE COURT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 115 (1982).
71. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1865, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 2 Fallos 143 (Arg.).
72. Mitre also "extended postal service, built roads and railroads, installed a judicial
system, expanded public education, and encouraged immigration." SHUMWAY, supra note 21,
at 227.
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services to the provinces, while at the same time cementing control over
provincial affairs and "hammer[ing] out of existence all traces of caudi-
llo-based populism, no matter how representative it was of provincial
sentiment. 73 Mitre raised a national army, fought a war with Paraguay,
and then unsuccessfully employed the army to try to reverse his defeat
at the polls in 1874.74
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Mitre's successor from 1868 to 1874,
was pro-Buenos Aires but was also a native of San Juan province in the
northwest. His writings and work gave form to the liberal theories in
Argentina for an entire generation. He advocated republican institutions,
free trade, freedom of religion, and laissez-faire economics. Sarmiento
ended the Paraguayan war, defeated the last of the caudillos as a mili-
tary force, and generally continued the progress of the liberal system.75
Sarmiento's presidency has been criticized for its ruthlessness in
dealing with Indians and gauchos, his propensity to intervene in the
provinces,76 and the corrupt means by which he promoted Nicolis
Avellaneda as his successor over the protests of Mitre.77 Avellaneda
continued the liberal projects, while he effectively completed the settle-
ment of Argentine land by forming an army to move south and liquidate
Indian society along the way. 78 The years 1880-1930 are sometimes
called "the years of triumph" in Argentina.79 However, as economic
progress mushroomed and immigration prospered and thus changed
Argentine social structure, creating a large new class of first and second
generation ethnic group members, the Creole elites were understandably
threatened. The elite became less interested in reform and more inter-
ested in retaining their hold on the top strata of society. Corruption
increased and public interest reform diminished.8"
As the immigrant class grew, the new citizens demanded political
power, and the fearful elite strengthened the already centralized power
of the executive branch of government.81 One-party rule was effectively
73. Id. at 228; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 172-85.
74. PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 15; see also CRASSWELLER, supra note 12, at 41.
75. Sarmiento also improved public education, increased immigration, enacted
homesteading policies, created specialized schools and colleges, expanded the public library
system, tripled the railways, rewrote the commercial and military legal codes, and ordered the
first census. SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 253.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 42.
78. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 184-85.
79. SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 45.
80. Id. at 52.
81. Id. at 55.
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in place by the 1880s, and constitutional norms were sometimes abused
or ignored through corruption or violence. 2 The political frustrations of
the immigrants were matched by economic decline in the 1890s. Immi-
grant-led revolts were successfully put down in 1890, 1893, and 1895.
Their by-product, however, was the creation of the only Argentine
political party with a continuous institutional history: the Union Cfvica
Radical, or Radical Party. 3
The Radicals and the newly formed Socialist Party engaged in
anarchism as their major instrument of dissent. Labor strikes proliferat-
ed, the national economy faltered, and a state of siege was proclaimed
in 1902, when Congress approved the expulsion of foreign-born persons
who were found by the President to be disturbing the public order.84
Similar strikes and retribution continued until 1910.5
The Radical Party, through its new leader Hip6lito Yrigoyen, again
attempted a revolution in 1905, assisted by elements of the army. After
its failure, Yrigoyen and the Radicals, citing widespread corruption in
government, refused to participate in any election or voting.86 After
voting in presidential elections was made compulsory in 1912,87 the
Radicals renewed their electoral participation and Yrigoyen won the
presidency in 1916. Yet Yrigoyen's presidency has been criticized for
tending to ignore Congress, spending money without an appropriation,
and having no programs. Yrigoyen also intervened in the provinces
widely - twenty times in fourteen provinces during his first term.
(There had been sixty-two such interventions between 1860 and 1912.)"8
In 1919, a labor strike flared and, at first, Yrigoyen ignored it. When the
army announced it would no longer support the government unless
strong measures were taken to deal with the strike, Yrigoyen relented.
For the first time under the 1853 Constitution, the military had
intervened in the processes of government. 89
Although the Supreme Court's endorsement of de facto presidential
rule in 1862 established an unfortunate precedent, early presidents
82. Id.
83. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 16, 42-44.
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 60.
87. Ley Electoral No. 8871(1), Tftulo Primero, Capftulo III, Tomo XVII COLEccI6N DE
LEYES NACIONALES [Electoral Law No. 8871(1), First Title, Chapter III, Volume XVII
COLLECTION OF NATIONAL LAWS] [hereinafter LEYES] 554 (1918) (Arg.); see KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 15, at 215.
88. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 16.
89. Id.
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generally advanced the causes of constitutional government and republi-
can institutions. Only when late nineteenth century immigration threat-
ened the traditional elites' hold on power did corrupt and lawless gov-
ernment by decree become prevalent. Through states of siege and inter-
ventions in the provinces, early twentieth -century presidents began to
drift from constitutional moorings.
B. United States, 1787-1890
In general, early presidents of the United States followed the
Lockean theory of emergency powers: "necessities" on occasion required
emergency measures, but the emergency powers were concededly extra-
legal. When it was feared' that the French Revolution might extend to
the United States, the Congress first *quadrupled the size of the regular
army, and then Hamilton and other Federalists began to urge the cre-
ation of a special army for use in intimidating political opponents and
suppressing dissent. 90 Although Congress authorized the provisional
army, President John Adams was reluctant to use the, special army and
instead relied upon civilian authority to enforce internal security. When
cabinet members questioned his restraint, Adams fired them and sought
to dismantle the provisional army.91
Presidential restraint diminished when the Republicans replaced the
Federalists. President Thomas Jefferson ordered the army to arrest Aaron
Burr for treason before he was turned over to civilian courts for trial.
Jefferson also employed the army to enforce embargo laws on the
northeastern border, and he had the army arrest civilians during the War
of 1812.92 When a British frigate attacked a'U.S. ship in 1806 during a
congressional recess, Jefferson obligated the treasury for the funds to
defend the ship, even though there was no appropriation for that pur-
pose. Notwithstanding the President's bold and occasionally unconstitu-
tional actions, Jefferson did not claim that his actions were authorized
by law. Generally, Jefferson disclosed his illegal actions to Congress
and asked for and received congressional approval.93
As General Andrew Jackson learned, executive officers who acted
illegally during times of emergency could be held liable for injuries
suffered due to their actions. Jackson declared martial law when fighting
the British in New Orleans in 1815. In a lawsuit against him, Jackson
90. JOAN M. JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-198o, at 14 (1991).
91. Id. at 14-15.
92. Id. at 15-16.
93. Lobel, supra note 30, at 1392-93.
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argued that necessity "may, in some cases ... justify a departure from
the constitution." 94 Jackson was fined, although Congress indemnified
him almost thirty years later.95
During the first century of the republic, emergency powers were
limited by the courts, either by fixing liability on officers for violating
legal rules notwithstanding emergency conditions, or through a restric-
tive determination of whether an emergency in fact existed. The quint-
essential example of the former is Justice Story's opinion for a unani-
mous Supreme Court in The Apollon,96 awarding damages against an
executive official for seizing a ship and its cargo, and rejecting the
defense of necessity:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the
high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes,
to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mis-
chief, by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the
laws. Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the re-
sponsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the Legisla-
ture will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can
only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated;
and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should
receive a suitable redress.97
Thus, by the 1850s, there was little cause for apprehension about
abuses of presidential emergency powers. The widespread nationalism
that followed the War of 1812 and the dominance of state governments
in most spheres of society quieted any concerns about internal security.98
94. Abraham Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Her) of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 239, 245-46 (1981).
95. Id. at 248-51; see also Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 175-76 (1804)
(unanimously upholding the imposition of liability on a naval commander for violation of a
statute limiting naval activities, even though the commander was following a presidential order).
96. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
97. Id. at 366-67. Alternatively, in Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851),
the Court upheld a damages award in similar circumstances by determining that whether an
emergency exists is a question for the jury. Although the Court did recognize a lawful execu-
tive emergency power, the standard adopted was akin to the president's power to repel attacks
- the need to act before the legislative authority is capable of acting must be clear. Id. at
133-35. Although in at least one instance the Supreme Court refused to adjudicate whether an
emergency existed, in that case, Congress had authorized the President's actions. Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). Notably, "[w]here the executive had proceeded on its
own, the judiciary displayed a remarkable willingness to analyze the relationship between its
conduct and the war emergency." CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 18 (1989).
98. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 16. Exceptions included President Jackson's deployment of
the army in an 1834 labor dispute and the army's arrest of civilians in the Dorr Rebellion in
Rhode Island in 1849. Id.
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At least the European Americans held this view. Since most Native
Americans were aliens, unprotected by the Constitution, the warfare that
started in the late 1820s due to the federal government's attempts to
settle the West permitted military officials to engage in widespread
atrocities with impunity. Given public support for the role of the army
in dealing with the Native Americans, the fact that even international
law and law of war norms were regularly broken was of little concern. 99
African American slaves were also abused through unilateral presi-
dential actions. Although slave revolts were not common, President
James Madison deployed General Andrew Jackson to destroy a fort
being maintained by escaped slaves in Florida and to return the slaves to
their owners. Most of the 300 slaves died in the destruction of the
fort.1° Later, President Jackson mobilized the army to put down Nat
Turner's slave revolt, although the militia did the deed before federal
troops arrived.' ' As slavery became a turbulent national issue, the
question of whether the military should be used in law enforcement also
became prominent nationally. Congress enacted Fugitive Slave Acts in
the early 1850s, which expressly allowed the president to use the army
to assist in returning fugitive slaves."°
Even President Lincoln's emergency actions taken during the Civil
War, which were more extensive and unilateral than those of any previ-
ous president, were in part justified by public necessity "whether strictly
legal or not."'' 0 3 Taking advantage of Congress not being in session,
Lincoln issued proclamations in 1861 which arguably ran counter to
Congress' commerce and war powers, when he effectively committed
the nation to war by ordering the blockade of southern ports and by
increasing the size of the armed forces. He labelled the event an "insur-
rection" and branded the citizens within the insurrection territory as
enemies of the United States, outside the protection of the Constitu-
tion.'4 In his 1861 report seeking congressional ratification of his ac-
tions, Lincoln practically conceded that his emergency actions were
unconstitutional. 105
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 19-21.
103. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 20, 24
(James D. Richardson ed., 1898) [hereinafter Richardson I].
104. The Supreme Court later agreed that it "is a question to be decided by him" whether
the insurrection is of such a character as will compel the president to treat fellow citizens as
belligerents. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
105. Richardson 1, supra note 103.
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One of Lincoln's 1861 proclamations authorized the commanding
general of the U.S. army to suspend the writ of habeas corpus "at any
point or in the vicinity of any military line which is now or which shall
be used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington."'
' 06
He later extended the power to the area between Washington, D.C. and
New York. 07 Although the Constitution does not expressly say that only
Congress may suspend the writ of habeas corpus, it was widely agreed
then, as it is now, that the clause was directed to Congress.' 08 Early in
the war, the Union army arrested hundreds of civilians suspected of
disloyalty. Many were held for long periods and some were tried by
military courts) °9
The circumstances of arrest and detention of political prisoners were
in clear violation of constitutional protections for those accused of
crime:
The person suspected of disloyalty was often seized at night,
searched, borne off to the nearest fort, deprived of his valuables,
and locked up ... crowded with men that had had similar experi-
ences. When he resolved to send for friends and an attorney, he
was informed that the rules forbade visitors, except in rare instanc-
es, and that attorneys were entirely excluded .... "O
John Merryman, one of the arrested civilians from Maryland, sought and
obtained a writ of habeas corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney sitting
in the circuit court in Baltimore."' Taney held that only Congress could
suspend the writ, echoing the commonly held view. The Merryman
decision was ignored, however, and while Merryman remained detained,
the legal issues r~mained clouded." 2 In February 1862, an executive
order provided for the release of most political prisoners, excepting
suspected spies "or others whose release at the present moment may be
deemed incompatible with the public safety."" 3 In 1863, Congress
granted the president the right to suspend the writ."
4
106. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3219 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter Richardson II].
107. Id. at 3220.
108. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 227 (1948).
109. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 26.
110. Id. at 261-62.
111. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
112. BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 60, at 16-17.
113. Richardson II, supra note 106, at 3303-3305.
114. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
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By 1864, Lincoln argued that "measures, otherwise unconstitutional,
might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the constitution, through the preservation of the nation."" 5 In 1866, the
Supreme Court rejected Lincoln's emergency powers claim. In another
habeas corpus case, Ex parte Milligan,' 6 the Court said: "No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented ... than
that any of [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government."".7 Nonetheless, the Lincoln
administration's bold exercise of emergency powers illustrated that
exigent circumstances tend to place political power in the executive
branch. As Lincoln demonstrated, future presidents could expect to act
without much resistance from Congress or the judiciary.
Following the Reconstruction, the next set of challenges which
produced conflict over emergency powers were labor strikes. For the
first time since Andrew Jackson used troops in an 1834 strike, President
Hayes called federal troops to quell an 1877 railway strike which had
reached thirty-eight cities." 8 In one sense, Hayes' actions were modest,
careful, and in keeping with constitutional formalities (responding to
calls from governors and first issuing proclamations to disperse in three
of the six states to which he sent troops). Moreover, the troops acted
with restraint and violent confrontations with workers were rare. In
another sense, however, this episode revealed the ad hoc nature of
federal responses to emergencies.
After the 1877 strike, a report prepared by a military officer recom-
mended that the government buttress the army for participation in
defending against domestic radicals. Congress remained hostile to the
concept of a standing army and in 1878 the Posse Comitatus Act was
passed, criminalizing the use of the army to enforce the laws, except
where authorized by the Constitution or by Congress." 9 Except for the
115. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 10 COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 65-66 (J. Nicolay & J. Harp eds., 1894). Lincoln's actions
during the Civil War, justified by the war power, included the right to determine the existence
of a "rebellion" and thereby justify calling forth the militia to suppress it; the right to increase
the size of the regular army beyond the authorized total; the right to suspend habeas corpus;
the right to proclaim martial law, including the right to arrest without warrant and to detain
without judicial review; the right to seize property if necessary to the successful prosecution
of the war; the right to spend funds without an appropriation; and the right to censor the
press. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 36-37 (1951).
116. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
117. Id. at 121.
118. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 34.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988). For a history of the evolution toward the Posse Comitatus
Act, see David Engdahl, The New Civil Disturbances Regulations: The Threat of Military
Intervention, 49 IND. L.J. 581, 597-603 (1974).
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1894 Pullman strike, assessed in the next Part of this article, the Posse
Comitatus Act effectively curtailed excessive use of the military in
internal security in the late nineteenth century. 20
Thus, except for the Civil War, the experiences with presidential
emergency powers in the first century of the United States isolated the
executive's authority to act in emergencies to narrow and extra-constitu-
tional limits. An extreme emergency threatening the nation had to be at
hand; the unlawful conduct had to be terminated when the emergency
ended; the acting official had to concede the illegality of the conduct;
the conduct had to be reviewable by the courts or Congress; and judicial
remedies or congressional indemnification had to be available for any
wrongs suffered as a result of the actions taken in the name of the
emergency. 12' Although this system expressly permitted the president to
engage in unlawful conduct and to violate the Constitution, it was
thought by early leaders that the difficulties in creating a constitutional
justification for the exercise of emergency powers were more grave than
allowing the president to act unlawfully in certain instances. The re-
quirement of congressional or judicial review tended further to discour-
age presidential abuses, while citizen respect for the Constitution provid-
ed an additional disincentive to presidents who would openly violate its
terms. 122
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
IN THE MODERN ERA
The emergence of theories of inherent constitutional executive
power occurred at different times and under different circumstances in
Argentina and the United States. In Argentina, presidential excesses first
proliferated as the military intervened in civilian life, accompanied by
economic turmoil and gridlock in government bureaucracies. In the
United States, the trend began with the emergence of the nation as a
world power. The idea of acting to protect the national security emerged
to provide a virtually limitless justification for presidential discretion. In
this Part, the rise of inherent executive emergency powers in the United
States and Argentina will be traced. This Part will also examine the
performance of the legislature and judicial branches of the two govern-
ments in fulfilling their constitutionally contemplated roles of checking
this executive power.
120. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 45.
121. Lobel, supra note 30, at 1396.
122. Id. at 1396-97.
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A. Argentina, 1930-Present
Although Argentina had suffered challenges to its constitutional
system and its laws, by 1930 Argentines surveyed the future from a
perspective of seventy years of unbroken constitutional succession to the
presidency and eighteen years of participatory democracy. Notwith-
standing the effects of the worldwide depression of 1929-1930, rapid
growth had made the average Argentine better off than the average
Spaniard and only slightly less well-paid than the average Italian. None-
theless, President Yrigoyen's second term ended prematurely in 1930
when, for the first time, a military coup toppled an elected government
in Argentina. 123 The coup leader, retired General Jos6 F. Uriburu, de-
clared himself president and promised his "respect for the Constitution
and basic laws in force."' 124 Thus began a downward spiral from which
Argentina has yet to recover.
1. The Rise of Inherent Emergency Powers
The decline in Argentina has been economic and political in nature.
More fundamentally, it has been a period of decline in respect for the
Constitution and the basic laws of the nation. Uriburu's pledge, repeated
by coup leaders and even some elected presidents since 1930, reflects
Argentine reality for the past sixty years - leaders seize control or take
other actions illegally while simultaneously promising to obey the laws.
Since 1930, there have been five military coups: in 1943, 1955, 1962,
1966, and 1976. A new constitution remained in place only from
1949-1955. The Supreme Court was completely or partially restructured
seven times. No civilian president before Menem served his full term in
office. When the military has not officially been in power, it has wield-
ed enormous influence, and when civilians have held the presidency,
they have supported military coups.
125
The Argentine Constitution separates federal powers in terms that
are virtually copied from the U.S. Constitution. 2 6 Although the
123. See generally CRASSWELLER, supra note 12, ch. 3.
124. Quoted in ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA,
1928-1945, at 58 (1969).
125. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 3-8.
126. See CONST. ARG. arts. 67, 86, 100, 104. As the Chairman of the Committee on
Constitutional Amendments to the Buenos Aires Convention of 1860 said:
The committee has been guided in its recommendations by the provisions of a
similar constitution, recognized as the most perfect, viz., that of the United States.
The provisions of this Constitution are most readily applicable to Argentine
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Argentine founders had no intention of making the executive
subordinate to the legislature, a concept foreign to their Spanish
tradition, 27 the country was still suffering the ill effects of the tyrannical
Rosas regime in 1853 in the same way that the North American
founders were working in the shadow of the recent yoke of British
domination. Thus, checking and control mechanisms were fashioned in
Argentina as they were in the United States. 2 The six-year presidential
term was offset by a prohibition on reelection. Although the Argentine
president has appointment powers unencumbered by senatorial advice
and consent, his power is checked in one sense by a requirement that all
acts and orders of the president be countersigned by a member of the
cabinet. 1
29
Judicial review of the acts of coordinate branches of government
was established early on in Argentina, 30 as it was in the United States,
based on the implications of popular sovereignty rather than an explicit
textual grant of power. In one of its earliest decisions, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that the framers of the Argentine Constitution
"sought to imitate the Constitution of the United States" with regard to
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. '3' The judicial power in Argentina
is "vested in a supreme court of justice and in such other inferior courts
as Congress may establish in the national territory."'' 32 Judges hold office
during good behavior and may be removed on the same grounds that
U.S. Supreme Court justices may be removed. 133 The Supreme Court
conditions, having served as the basis for the formation of the Argentine Confeder-
ation ... The democratic government of the United States represents the last word
of human logic, for the Constitution of the United States is the only one that has
been made for and by the people ....
Alexander W. Weddell, A Comparison of Executive and Judicial Powers Under the Constitu-
tions of Argentina and the United States, 31 BULL. OF THE C. OF WM. & MARY No. 5 (1937)
(quoting the Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments at the Buenos Aires
Convention of 1860).
127. Weddell, supra note 126, at 8.
128. See id. at 13.
129. Id. at 11.
130. See Judgment of Nov. 12, 1886 (Municipalidad de la Capital v. Isabel A. de
Elortondo [Municipality of the Capital v. Isabel A. de Elortondo]), Corte Suprema de Justicia
de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 33 Fallos 162 (Arg.). The Supreme Court
declared a presidential decree unconstitutional in 1863. Phanor J. Eder, Judicial Review in
Latin America, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 570, 576 (1960).
131. Judgment of May 20, 1865 (Gomes v. la Naci6n [Gomes v. the Nation]), Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 2 Fallos 36 (Arg.).
132. CON T. ARo. art. 94.
133. See id. art. 45 (concerning impeachment of the president and vice-president, members
of the cabinet, Supreme Court members, and federal judges); see also id. art. 96 (declaring that
judges will hold office for life and cannot be removed, except for cases of misconduct).
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originally was required to have nine members, but the court's size was
decreased to five in 1863."
These similar constitutional provisions do not account for the weak-
er role of the judiciary in Argentina than in the United States. In the
United States the foundation for an independent judiciary had been laid
early, albeit with some uncertainty. 135 In contrast, neither Spain nor the
early Argentine government had an independent judiciary strong enough
to assert itself against the executive. Thus, the inability of the modem
Argentine judiciary to exercise its constitutional powers independent of
strong-willed executives, civil or military, is not surprising. 36
The courts and the Congress have done little to enforce the rule of
law and respect for the Constitution in Argentina. Symbolically, the
most important element in the decline of the Argentine legal system has
been the excessive exercise of emergency powers and their purported
constitutional sanction. This institutionalization of constitutional emer-
gency powers began in 1930, four days after the coup, when the Su-
preme Court was asked to decide whether to recognize formally the
legitimacy of the military government.'37 The Court faced a dilemma. If
it declared the new government unconstitutional, there was no mecha-
nism to assure that its decree would be obeyed. Nor was there any
protection for the justices' independence or, for that matter, their tenure.
The Court could risk losing whatever ability 'it had retained to control
the excesses of the military government. On the other hand, if it upheld
the government, it would legitimate an unconstitutional seizure of power
and thereby lessen the Court's independence and the integrity of the
legal system.
In a brief opinion signed by all of its members, the Court declared
that "de facto," the new government was capable of carrying out any of
the ends of the elected government and would be recognized as legally
valid notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of its origin. 3 ' The
134. Act 182 of Aug. 28, 1858, art. 12, 1852-1880 Leyes Nacional 175, stated that the
Supreme Court would have nine members and two prosecutors (see art. 12). Act. 27 of Oct.
1862, art. 6, 1852-1880 Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina [hereinafter A.D.L.A.] 354, brought
the number of Supreme Court members to five and added a solicitor general (see art. 6).
135. See Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, reprinted in LAUNCHING THE
"EXTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA (R. Hoffman ed., 1992).
136. See Weddell, supra note 126, at 17.
137. Decree of Sept. 10, 1930, 158 Fallos 290 (Arg.).
138. Id. The de facto doctrine originated in 1862 when the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to Mitre's presidency. See supra text accompanying note 71. In 1865, the Supreme
Court declared that a de facto government "exercised provisionally all national power ...
with the right of the triumphant revolution, assented to by the people." Judgment of Aug. 5,
1865 (Baldomero Martinez v. Manuel Otero); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 2 Fallos 127-(Arg.). Over time, the'Supreme Court
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government should be given legal sanction, said the Court, on the basis
of "necessity," "public policy," and for the purpose of "protecting the
citizens, whose interests could be affected because it is not now possible
for them to question the legality of those now in power.
139
The Court purported to rely on its 1927 decision,' 4° where a provin-
cial court judge's authority to decide a case was challenged on the
ground that a declared state of siege in that province deprived the local
judge of judicial power. In the 1927 case, the Court made the unexcep-
tional decision that so long as a federal judge had not been appointed to
replace the state official, the state official could legitimately act - he
had "de facto" remained the provincial judge.14' No unconstitutional
assertion of federal power was alleged in the 1927 case; indeed, the
claimant was seeking to take advantage of the state of siege to avoid an
adverse decision by the provincial judge. In contrast, in, 1930, the new
government itself was illegitimate, having asserted its right to rule
without the benefit of elections and constitutional processes. The Su-
preme Court simply abdicated its responsibility to measure official
conduct against legal norms. Although later decisions by the Court
purported to limit the powers of a de facto government,142 the lawless
character of emergency powers has rendered judicial controls ineffectual
even concerning executive usurpations of the basic right to rule
Argentina.
The 1930 decision effectively relegated the judiciary to a position of
broadened its recognition of de facto governments, granting to them legislative as well as
executive powers. See generally J. Irizzary y Puente, The Nature and Powers of a "De
Facto" Government in Latin America, 30 TUL. L. REV. 15, 42-44 (1955) (detailing develop-
ment of recognition). On June 7, 1943, in the wake of the coup that toppled President
Castillo, the Court received a communique issued by the Military Government that had held
power and again upheld the new de facto government. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 58, at
832-33. The latest military coup, in 1976, was given legitimacy by the Court in 1977. In
Jaime Lockman the Court found that the junta's plan for governing was "part of the Constitu-
tion so long as the causes which conferred legitimacy to the norms remain in existence, those
norms being grounded on the state of necessity which prompted the adoption of exceptional
measures." Jaime Lockman, [1978-C] Revista Jurfdica Argentina-La Ley [hereinafter L.L.]
331, 332 (1978).
139. Decree of Sept. 10, 1930, 158 Fallos 291 (Arg.).
140. Judgment of June 16, 1926 (Crist6bal Moreno Postigo re. Remoci6n de Tutela
[Crist6bal Moreno Postigo re. Removal of Guardianship]), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 148 Fallos 303 (Arg.).
141. Id. at 306.
142. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 15, 1933 (Administraci6n de Impuestos Internos v.
Martiniano Malmonge Nebreda [Administration of Internal Taxes v. Martiniano Malmonge
Nebreda]), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 169
Fallos 309 (Arg.), where the Supreme Court declared that, although a de facto president
generally enjoys the same authority as a de jure president, he lacks authority to create new
taxes as long as the legislature does not confirm their validity. Id. at 321.
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utter subservience to the executive branch, destroying whatever indepen-
dence Argentine judges might have brought to bear in upholding consti-
tutional norms. Since 1947, when President Per6n initiated the impeach-
ment of three disfavored Supreme Court justices, the entire Court and
most of the remainder of the Argentine judiciary have been replaced en
masse five times.
143
2. States of Siege
Under the French revolutionary law of 1791, a state of siege could
be invoked to empower the military only when a part of the nation was
actually under siege by an external enemy, and only for the purposes of
repelling the attack.144 Pursuant to article 23 of Argentina's Constitution,
"internal disorder" may trigger a state of siege and constitutional rights
may be suspended, apparently including any individual rights except the
right to petition for habeas corpus.
45
In theory, this extraordinary set of presidential powers is subject to
constitutional controls and to judicial review to assure that the pre-
scribed mechanisms are followed. The Constitution requires that the
Congress either approve a request for a state of siege declaration in
advance, or after the fact if Congress is in recess.' 46 Article 23 limits the
state of siege to "the Province or territory in which the disturbance of
order exists." Although the president may arrest citizens, he may not
mete out punishment and he must permit the detainee to leave the
country if he wishes. Finally, article 100 grants the judiciary "jurisdic-
tion over.., all cases dealing with matters governed by the Constitu-
tion ... " apparently including challenges to government actions taken
during a state of siege. These safeguards have proven ineffective.
Congress has merely rubber-stamped what the executive branch has
143. PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 134. The other breaks of constitutional order were not
followed by similar rulings of the Supreme Court, mainly because the Supreme Court itself
was removed after every coup. This happened in 1955 when President Per6n was overthrown,
in 1966 when General Onganfa overthrew President Illia, and again in 1976 when a military
junta toppled President Isabel Per6n. Only in the overthrow of President Frondizi in 1962 did
the Supreme Court play a substantial role when it swore in the president of the Senate, Mr.
Josd Maria Guido, as the new president of the country, thereby frustrating the wishes of the
coup leaders to hold power again. The Supreme Court members appointed by the military
during de facto governments were replaced by new judges every time a civilian government
was reinstated. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 58, at 832-33.
144. See MICHELE VOISSET, L'ARTICLE 16 DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958
[ARTICLE 16 OF THE OCTOBER 4, 1958 CONSTITUTION] (1969).
145. Compare the experience with suspending habeas corpus in the United States, supra
text accompanying note 108.
146. CONST. ARG. arts. 53, 67(26), 86(19).
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done; states of siege have routinely been extended to the entire nation;
and the limits on arrest and punishment have been abused.
States of siege have been imposed more than thirty times, in all or
parts of Argentina. Siege periods have been as short as six weeks and as
long as nine years.'47 The safeguards contemplated by article 23 to curb
executive excesses in the use of the siege device could have been effec-
tive only if an independent judiciary enforced them and punished those
who abused them. The courts have failed. That the courts have on
occasion rendered decisions restraining the government and protecting
individual rights may have served only to establish what Frederick
Snyder calls a "discourse of rationality" 4' surrounding states of siege,
obscuring the injustices suffered by thousands who gained no relief.
49
Admittedly, however, judges often have been asked to perform their
tasks under nearly impossible conditions during states of siege.
In 1976, the military seized the government from the ineffectual and
exhausted President Maria Estela [Isabel] Martinez de Per6n. Conve-
niently, Per6n's government had declared the entire nation to be in a
state of siege since 1974.150 After President General Jorge Rafael Videla
promised to safeguard the "highest interests" of the nation and to "de-
velop[] a genuine spirit of social justice,"' 5' the junta issued the Statute
for the Process of National Reorganization,' 52 in which it dissolved
federal and provincial legislative bodies; fired the principal government
officials; prohibited political party and union activities; and declared that
the Constitution would remain in force only "to the extent that it does
not oppose the main objectives set forth by the military junta or the
provisions" of its law.'53
Soon thereafter, the junta put into place a series of statutes and
decrees restricting individual liberties. The Act to Consider the Conduct
of Those Persons Who Prejudice the Higher Interests of the Nation
54
permitted the government to scrutinize negligence in the exercise of a
147. PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 131.
148. Frederick E. Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argentina: The Politics and
Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 LAW. OF THE AM. 503, 518 (1984).
149. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 132.
150. Decreto 1368 of Nov. 6, 1974, XXXIV-D A.D.L.A. (1974).
151. Quoted in Snyder, supra note 148, at 508.
152. Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganizaci6n Nacional [Statute for the Process of
National Reorganization] of Mar. 24, 1976, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1021 (1976).
153. Ley 21.258, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1032 (1976).
154. Acta para Considerar la Conducta de Aquellas Personas Responsables de Ocasionar
Perjuicios a los Superiores Intereses de la Naci6n [Act to Consider the Conduct of Those
Persons Who Prejudice the Higher Interests of the Nation]; XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1020 (1976).
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public, political, or social interest, acts or omissions that facilitate sub-
version, tolerance of corruption, and failure to observe basic moral
principles in activities that involve the public interest. 5"
Under the military junta between 1976 and 1983, the "Dirty War"
against alleged subversives was conducted under the state of siege
declared by the since-deposed constitutional government. Of the thou-
sands who were arrested and thousands more who disappeared by 1978,
23 lawyers were murdered, 109 were detained, and 41 disappeared.
Judges who were thought to have been too lenient with alleged subver-
sives or too thorough in their investigation of human rights abuses were
themselves threatened with murder.'
56
The basic legal question surrounding a declared state of siege is
whether internal disorder or foreign attack merits the suspension of
constitutional rights.15 7 Although this question may appear to be
quintessentially for judicial determination under Argentine law,' the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to review on the merits the constitu-
tionality of an executive or congressional declaration of a state of
siege.' 59
Other statutes and decrees during the Dirty War criminalized partici-
pation in political parties or labor strikes, publication of news concerning
terrorism, subversion, or kidnappings and the discovery of bodies,
criticism of official policies in university classrooms, and political acts
that related to a political party.' 6° The serious legal problem facing the
junta was in circumventing the part of article 23 which declares that the
executive "shall not convict or apply punishment upon [its] own
authority." Undaunted, the junta engaged in interrogation, indefinite
155. Id. art. 1.
156. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/I 1.49, doc. 19, corr. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Human Rights Report].
157. See CONST. ARG. art. 23.
158. GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO
[MANUAL OF ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 455-60 (1981); Judgment of Oct. 22, 1962
(re Ruggero), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n (National Supreme Court of Justice],
254 Fallos 116 (Arg.).
159. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 28, 1956 (Iscaro), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 236 Fallos 632 (Arg.); Judgment of Aug. 26,
1960 (Trossi), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice],
247 Fallos 528 (Arg.); Judgment of Apr. 26, 1961 (Almeyra), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 249 Fallos 522 (Arg.); see also BIDART CAMPOS,
supra note 70, at 100-101.
160. Trabajo [Employment], Ley 21.400, XXXVI-C A.D.L.A. 2116(1976); Universidades
Nacionales [National Universities], Ley 21.276, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1041 (1976); Seguridad
Nacional [National Security], Ley 21.322, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1102 (1976); Seguridad
Nacional [National Security], Ley 21.325, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1104 (1976); Ley de Represi6n
del Sabotaje [Law of Repression of Sabotage], Ley 21.264, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1034 (1976).
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detention, and arrest on suspicion alone. Summary proceedings before
special military tribunals were set up, and the enforcers were themselves
granted immunity from prosecution for abuses except in the military
courts.' 6' Thus, instead of "convicting" or "punishing" citizens, the junta
detained enemies of the state for arbitrary periods, tortured them, and
caused them to disappear.' 62
After the Dirty War, the lower courts began to assert a somewhat
stronger role. At first, the courts simply adopted the executive's asser-
tions that the accused was linked to "subversive activities" in reviewing
a request for habeas corpus.1 63 However, when well-known defense
lawyer and human rights activist Carlos Mariano Zamorano sought
habeas relief in 1977 after being detained since December 1974, the
acting Federal Court of Appeals ordered his release after rejecting the
"reasonableness" of his detention.' 64 His was thus the first case where a
court reviewed an arrest under a state of siege and required that the
government offer "particular facts" linking his detention to the reasons
for the state of siege. Zamorano was held while the government ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, and after the executive supplied informa-
tion ex parte informing the Supreme Court of his supposed "communist
contacts," his release was revoked. Zamorano was given no opportunity
to contest the accuracy of the government's claims of subversion.
65
Thus, the decision in Zamorano merely succeeded in supplying the
government with a blueprint for perfecting unlimited detention.
16
In another case, the father of Ines Ollero sought habeas corpus relief
in order to find facts concerning the location of his daughter, who had
disappeared in 1976.167 Although one of the requirements of habeas
161. Seguridad Nacional [National Security], Ley 21.272, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1038
(1976); Fuerzas de Seguridad [Security Forces], Ley 21.267, XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1036 (1976);
Seguridad Nacional [National Security], Ley 21.460, XXXVI-D A.D.L.A. 1894 (1976);
Consejos de Guerra Especiales Estables [Permanent Special Councils of War], Ley 21.461,
XXXVI-D A.D.L.A. 2895 (1976).
162. See Human Rights Report, supra note 156; see also PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 131;
MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSON, DOSSIER SECRETO: ARGENTINA'S DESAPARECIDOS AND THE MYTH
OF THE "DIRTY WAR" 223-94 (1993).
163. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1977 (Tizio), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 299 Fallos 294 (Arg.).
164. Carlos Mariono Zamorano, Federal Chamber of Appeals of Buenos Aires (1977).
For a lengthy excerpt from the Zamorano opinion in English, see Case Notes of Some Typical
Cases Affecting Lawyers and Judges in Argentina - Appendix 1, BULL. CENTRE INDEPEN-
DENCE JUDGES & LAW., Feb. 1978, at 13.
165. See Judgment of Aug. 9, 1977 (Zamorano), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 298 Fallos 441 (Arg.).
166. See Snyder, supra note 148, at 516-47.
167. Judgment of Apr. 25, 1978 (Ollero), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 300 Fallos 457, 469 (Arg.).
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corpus - that an official responsible for the detention be identified -
could not be met in Ollero's case, the court ordered a broadened investi-
gation in light of evidence that she had been among a group of bus
passengers last seen on their way to a certain police station in Buenos
Aires. 168 As with Zamorano, however, the investigation did not produce
information helpful to Ollero, and the courts denied him relief.' 69
The courts have reviewed some executive actions taken under siege
conditions. 7 For example, in Sofia the Court agreed to determine
whether executive acts were "clearly and obviously unreasonable, in-
volving methods that have no relation at all to the purposes of Article
23." 71 Even, this review for reasonableness extended only to constitu-
tional rights other than personal liberties. Since the Sofia case, review
for rights abuses has most often been minimal.'72
The only successful petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
those arrested under the Dirty War state of siege was brought for jour-
nalist and newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman. Timerman was arrest-
ed in 1977 at the request of the army commander-in-chief, allegedly be-
cause of his association with a businessman who was suspected of
having supported a left-wing terrorist group. After a period of interro-
gation and torture, Timerman was tried and acquitted by a military
tribunal. Thereafter, the junta ordered his house arrest and denied him
political rights and employment. Eventually, the Supreme Court ordered
his release on the ground that his acquittal on the charge that he associ-
ated unlawfully with the businessman ended any justification for contin-
ued detention. He was being "punished" in a manner not authorized by
article 23.
73
Timerman's exceptional "victory" was likely the product of intense
international pressure for his release.' 74 Even Timerman's vindication
was hollow, however, as the generals "released" him only by expelling
him from Argentina and stripping him of his citizenship.' 75 Further,
168. Id. at 461.
169. See Snyder, supra note 148, at 517.
170. Judgment of May 22, 1959 (Sofia), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 243 Fallos 504 (Arg.).
171. See id. at 533-34.
172. See Garro, supra note 47, at 327-30.
173. Judgment of July 20, 1978 (Timerman), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 300 Fallos 816 (Arg.); Judgment of Sept. 17, 1979
(Timerman), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice],
301 Fallos 771 (Arg.).
174. See JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER
128-29, 251 (Tony Talbot trans., 1981); ANDERSON, supra note 162, at 247-48, 285-86.
175. TIMERMAN, supra note 174, at 252.,
Fall 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
since the Timerman case, the courts have continued to sustain state of
siege detentions when the executive merely asserts that the detainee has
a "subversive connection."'
' 76
The Argentine Constitution protects individual rights to life, person-
al safety, and due process, and it forbids torture and inhumane imprison-
ment even during a state of siege. That Argentine judges have been
largely unable or unwilling to curtail abuses of these rights is testament
to the sweeping emergency powers of the executive in Argentina. Aided
by chronic resort to the siege devices, personal threats to judges, and
corruption, the executive has kept the courts firmly in check while it has
used them to legitimate the seeming rationality of their actions. The
single judge who, in 1981, ruled that a state of siege was unconstitution-
al immediately left Argentina.
177
As Fred Snyder wrote:
Legal process has ... been singularly important in the mobilization
of state terror in that it has enabled the junta to address society not
only through the amplifier at the rally, the proclamation in the
newspaper, the rifle butt on the street, and the electrode in the
torture chamber, but through a vocabulary of reason and right as
well. . . [C]ourts stay open for business ... draw[ing] the junta
into the enviable world of formal rationality where it shares the
benefits that only an apparatus of justification can confer.
78
3. Pardons
During the Videla military government, clandestine detention centers
were established where persons suspected of being subversive or having
connections to subversive groups were brought. Members of the military
arrested the suspect first, after arriving at the person's residence late at
night in plain clothes. Many were detained for long periods, many were
tortured before being released, and, between 1976 and 1983, some
10,000 persons disappeared and were never seen alive again - the
desaparecidos. 1
79
176. See Garro, supra note 47, at 334.
177. See R. Fernandez Taboada & J. Vidal, Quiin es Pedro Narvaiz [Who is Pedro
Narvaiz], SoMos, Feb. 11, 1983, at 6, 10.
178. Snyder, supra note 148, at 519.
179. The Findings of the National Commission of the Disappearance of Persons
(CONADEP), established by Presidential Decree No. 157 (1983), are described in ANDERSON,
supra note 162, at 9-12. CONADEP's report, submitted in 1984, confirmed the disappearance
of 8,960 persons in Argentina from 1976 to 1983. 365 detention camps were identified, and
more than 1,300 military and police officers were named as having committed human rights
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After an elected government was returned to power, prosecutions of
human rights abuses and investigations of the desaparecidos began.
Upon taking office in 1983, President Alfonsfn faced the question of
how to punish military officials for the Dirty War, without provoking
military retaliation and thus threatening the fragile return to civilian rule.
Pleasing all sides was out of the question. Leniency would cause a
public outcry and make the new government seem complicit in the
atrocities. Harshness would not only alienate the military; it might cause
them to try to hold on to power at all costs.1
80
The Alfonsfn government attempted to compromise with the mili-
tary. President Alfonsfn ordered military officers charged with Dirty
War crimes to be tried by military tribunals under military law. Civilian
courts could review the sentences and could decide any case for which
no verdict was reached in six months. 8' Although the Military Code of
Justice clearly provided for military jurisdiction over the Dirty War
trials, human rights activists knew that military trials would be shams
and would provide opportunities to destroy damning evidence. They also
argued that the Military Code was unconstitutional to the extent that it
conferred jurisdiction on military courts over cases involving crimes
against civilians. Indeed, the Criminal Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires
had determined that the charges involving the desaparecidos fell outside
military jurisdiction, and that pending kidnapping charges involving
conscripts from the Military College could be tried by civilian courts
under the new prospectively enacted penalties because, according to
Argentine law, abduction remains a crime until solved.
1 82
On appeal, the Supreme Court admitted that the Military Code was
probably unconstitutional. It nonetheless upheld the Alfonsfn plan, citing
its unwillingness to undermine a method chosen by Alfonsfn and the
Congress to respond to the Dirty War. 83 Thus, the President's political
decision to steer a compromising course, endorsed after the fact by
Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court, produced the beginnings of
judicial proceedings in civilian and military courts. In 1985, the court of
appeals convicted five of the nine members of the junta that ruled
abuses. See also NUNCA MS: INFORME DE LA COMIS6N NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICI6N
DE PERSONAS [NEVER AGAIN: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEAR-
ANCE OF PERSONS] 8-10 (1984); ANDERSON, supra note 162, at 223-94.
180. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 141.
181. Id. at 141-42.
182. See id. at 217 n.17.
183. See 109 El Derecho-Legislaci6n Argentina [hereinafter E.D.L.A.] 6037 (1984);
Congress ratified Alfonsfn's plan by enacting amendments to the Code of Military Justice,
Ley No. 23.049 of Feb. 13, 1984, XLIV-A A.D.L.A. 8 (1984).
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Argentina between 1976 and 1983. l
The Alfonsin government also asked for and the Congress enacted
legislation that first, set a statute of limitations for these crimes, and
second, declared that all military officers below a certain rank were
legally deemed to be following the orders of superiors, thereby exculpat-
ing them from any criminal liability." 5 Prosecutions languished in this
fashion until October 1989, when the new government of Carlos
Menem, as a result of pressure by the Argentine military, granted par-
dons to more than 200 military officers and other members of the armed
forces who had been charged and were awaiting trial.
Menem's pardons were unprecedented in size and scope, and
prompted widespread criticism. 86 The 1853 Constitution gives Congress
the authority to "grant general amnesties."18 7 It also allows the president
to "pardon or commute penalties for crimes subject to federal jurisdic-
tion, with a previous report from the competent tribunal."' 8 In 1932, the
Supreme Court said that the president's pardon power
implies the pardon of punishments, in order to suppress or alleviate
in special cases the excessive rigor of the law. The [congressional]
amnesty represents instead forgetting a criminal act, to establish
calm and social coexistence .... The presidential pardon is partic-
ular and refers to a given individual or individuals; the amnesty is
essentially general and extends to all those involved in a certain
category of events.189
The Court added that the pardon "eliminates the penalty adjudged"
while the amnesty does "away with their effects."' 9
The Menem pardons of the military officers raise questions besides
prospectivity. The size of the group pardoned arguably usurped the
congressional prerogative of granting amnesty and interfered with the
184. The Federal Court of Appeals that acted as trial court convicted the members of the
juntas on December 9, 1985. 309 Fallos 33 (Arg.). Although some changes were made in the
sentences imposed, those convictions were affirmed by the Argentine Supreme Court on
December 31, 1986. 309 Fallos 1657 (Arg.).
185. See Fuerzas Armadas y de Seguridad [Armed and Security Forces], Ley 23.492,
1987-A E.D.L.A. 299 (1986); Fuerzas Armadas y de Seguridad [Armed and Security Forces],
Ley 23.521, 1987-A E.D.L.A. 341 (1987).
186. See, e.g., E. Oteiza, El Indulto [The Pardon], 7337 El Derecho [hereinafter E.D.]
(1989); D. Herrendorf, Un Desparramo de Indultos [A Scattering of Pardons], 7477 E.D.
(1990).
187. CONST. ARG. art. 67(17).
188. Id. art. 86(6).
189. Judgment of July 15, 1932 (Hip6lito Yrigoyen), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 165 Fallos 199, 211 (Arg.).
190. Id.
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application of the Criminal Code. 91 Further, torture is itself proscribed
by the Argentine Constitution' 92 and is forbidden by the International
Convention on Torture and Cruel Treatment which was ratified by
Argentina in 1987.193
Faced with Menem's decree, Congress and the courts buckled to
political intimidation. While the Congress had not shown any leadership
in responding to the junta's abuses, it had endorsed Alfonsfn's compro-
mise position and graced it with legislative approval after the fact. When
Menem acted, Congress remained silent, notwithstanding the fact that
Menem effectively repudiated Congress' prior action and, in doing so,
may have invaded congressional power to "grant general amnesties."
When Menem's pardons of the military officers were challenged by
the families of victims of the desaparecidos, the Supreme Court ruled
that the victims' families lacked standing to sue. 9 4 Despite the fact that
the pardon appeared to be an amnesty and that Congress neither initiated
nor supported it, the Court practically validated the brutal torture and
murder of thousands of Argentine citizens.
The Supreme Court's refusal to rule on the validity of the Menem
pardons in Riveros called into question prior decisions invalidating
prospective pardons,"' as well as constitutional provisions protecting
against torture and the application of the Criminal Code. In Riveros, the
Court refused to grant standing to the victims' families after the prose-
cutors declined to appeal the pardons. Since the prosecutors received
instructions from the Attorney General to abide by the pardons and
request termination of criminal proceedings, it was absurd for the Court
to rely on their inaction as a basis for denying relief to the families.'96
Still, President Menem faced a real crisis, not an imagined one.
Threats from the military must not be taken lightly in Argentina. The
situation in Argentina in 1989 was hardly secure as spiraling inflation,
191. See Alberto Bianchi, Apostillas a la Amnistla Presidencial a Proposito del caso
Riveros [Notes on Presidential Amnesties through a Look at the Riveros Case], 7732 E.D.
(1991).
192. CONST. ARG. art. 18.
193. Act 23.338, XLVII A.D.L.A. 1481 (1987).
194. Riveros, Omar S. y otros [Riveros, Omar S. and others], [1991-I] J.A. 306 (1991)
(Arg.).
195. See Judgment of Aug. 6, 1868 (Simon Luego), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6 Fallos 229 (Arg.) (decided by the first
Supreme Court, whose members included Jos6 A. Gorostiaga, one of the framers of the
pardons clause in the 1853 Constitution); Judgment of Mar. 8, 1932 (Yrigoyen), Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 165 Fallos 199 (Arg.).
196. See Judgment of Nov. 12, 1990 (Riveros), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], [1991-1] J.A. 306 (1990) (Arg.).
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other economic woes, labor strife, and general dissatisfaction with the
government presented the new Menem administration with a precarious
political and social environment.' 97 Menem needed the support of the
military and could not brook their opposition at such a tentative time in
Argentina's political life. Thus, his pardons were a bold but-possibly
necessary action to avoid a potential military revolt, more violence, and
yet another return to dictatorship.' 98
So viewed, President Menem's pardons, like President Lincoln's
actions in 1861, may have been unconstitutional but necessary.' 99 The
Argentine president does not have unlimited discretion to mete out
pardons - the congressional amnesty power must be taken into account
and, arguably, pardons before conviction are forbidden in Argentina, as
are pardons that undermine another provision of the Constitution, such
as the protection against torture. Because Riveros practically means that
no one would have standing to challenge a pardon where the executive
directs the prosecutors to drop the prosecutions, the Supreme Court
improperly shirked its constitutional duty to measure the pardons against
the Constitution.
Further, the president of Argentina has a duty to act constitutionally,
regardless of' the amenability of his actions to judicial review. The
president of the United States may not pardon someone who has been
impeached; he must exercise his apparently unreviewable discretion
within constitutional limits.2°° President Menem had an obligation to
exercise his pardon consistent with the parallel power of Congress and
the rights provisions of his Constitution. If ie believed that he had to
pardon the military officers to save the nation, he should have conceded
the unconstitutionality of his actions, issued the pardons, and then
sought ratification of his action by Congress.
The nearly 300 Menem pardons have more the character of amnesty
than of pardon in Argentine law.20' Menem's actions were more an
attempt to "do away with [the] effects" of the Dirty War crimes than to
"eliminate the penalty adjudged., 20 2 Although the individuals to be
197. See generally JAMES NEILSON, EL FIN DE LA QUIMERA [THE END OF THE CHIME-
RA] (1992).
198. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS 202 (1989).
199. See generally supra note 138.
200. See MOORE, supra note 198, at 198; see also H.R.J. Res. 32, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (bill pending in the House Judiciary Committee would limit pardons to those convict-
ed).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90 (comparing pardon and amnesty in
Argentine law).
202. See Judgment of Mar. 8, 1932, 165 Fallos at 199.
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pardoned were named, no individualized attention was given to the
severity of their crimes. Admittedly, it may be that to await trial in the
individual cases would have been an untenable option in 1989. We will
never know.
If the Menem pardons may be fairly compared to Lincoln's actions
in 1861, in terms of the gravity and magnitude of the risk to each
nation, then Menem's conduct differed only in not asking Congress to
ratify his actions, and in not conceding the unconstitutionality of his
essential act. Similarly, the Argentine Congress did not perform its
responsibilities - it should have either supported the President's illegal
act with a ratifying statute,2°3 or challenged the President politically or
through impeachment proceedings. Lacking any indication of congres-
sional intent, the Supreme Court's task was politically difficult in
Riveros. The Court should nonetheless have decided the constitutional
questions presented by the victims' families' claim. Conceivably, the
full Court could have fairly proceeded, as two of its concurring justices
would have, in upholding the pardons as consistent with the Constitu-
tion.2°4 Congress' failure to act could have been read as acquiescence in
the President's actions and the rights questions could have been dis-
missed, as they were by the concurring justices, 25 as not properly before
the Court in this case. The alternative, ruling against the President,
would have placed the Court in the unenviable position of being unable
to enforce a decision that would surely have been resisted by the enforc-
ers. Still, the Argentine Constitution and the prospects for the rule of
law in Argentina would be improved if the Court had found the pardons
unconstitutional, though perhaps necessary under the circumstances.
In October 1992, the full Supreme Court reached the merits in
another challenge to the prospective pardons of 1989. In Aquino,20 6 the
public prosecutor, disobeying instructions from the Ministry of Justice,
joined relatives of the disappeared in challenging the pardons of mem-
bers of the military. In reversing a court of appeals decision, the Court
distinguished Riveros and found the prosecutor's challenge sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, even though he had acted in defiance of his
203. See Judgment of Nov. 28, 1871 (Cris6logo Andrade), Corte Suprema de Justicia de
la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 11 Fallos 405 (Arg.). A presidential action
approving an official's grant of amnesty to rebels was itself an amnesty, but congressional
ratification of his actions cured the constitutional defect. Id. at 415.
204. See Riveros, [199 1-1] J.A. 306, opinions of Justices Petracchi & Oyhanarte.
205. Id. at 310-11.
206. Judgment of Oct. 14, 1992 (Aquino), Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[National Supreme Court of Justice], [1993-11 J.A. 45 (1993) (Arg.).
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instructions. On the merits, the Court relied on the concurring opinion in
Riveros in affirming the constitutionality of prospective pardons.
4. Economic Emergencies
President Menem's pardons of officers accused of human rights
violations only exacerbated the political troubles facing his government.
During the same period, scandal plagued his administration and the
infamous Argentine inflation was spiraling to historic highs.207 The value
of the American dollar was skyrocketing, as Argentines queued before
money changers to trade their Argentine currency for dollars in hopes of
protecting their savings. Banks were forced to offer ridiculously high
interest rates on short-term savings in Argentine currency, in order to
lure customers. With seven day or shorter interest periods, customers
would cash in their investments, buy more dollars with their profit, and
force the value of the dollar higher, requiring the banks to offer even
higher interest rates to attract depositors. Prices were, all the while,
rising, as the value of the local currency deteriorated.
For Menem's government, the spiral was of immediate concern
because of a federal law which made the government's central bank
responsible for bank deposits in the event of bank default.208 Instead of
proposing a legislative solution or even seeking congressional support
for executive enforcement of existing laws, Menem issued a sweeping
presidential decree.20 9 The decree provided that banks were relieved
from paying all but a small portion of deposits to investors. The balance
would be covered by government bonds, with a value fixed in dollars. 10
Deposit holders were outraged. First, the promised bonds had not
been issued when the decree went into effect.21' When they were issued
five months later, their market value was far less than their declared
value. Second, accrued bond interest could not be collected for the first
year of the life of the bonds. Third, only Argentines who maintained
their savings in local currency were harshly affected by the decree; the
wealthy kept their savings in dollars. Finally, the banks themselves
207. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentina's President Turns Economics Into Poll Approval,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A20.
208. Act 21.256, XXXVII-A A.D.L.A. 121 (1977). The guarantee of the Central Bank
for deposits in cases of default was eliminated by means of Act 24.144 passed on September
23, 1992, and published in the "Boletfn Oficial" ["Official Bulletin"] of Oct. 22, 1992.
209. Presidential Decree No. 36/90, 2 E.D.L.A. 11 (1990).
210. Id.
211. See Alberto Bianchi, La Corte Suprema ha establecido su tesis oficial sobre la
emergencia economica [The Supreme Court has established its official thesis on the ec6nomic
emergency], [1991-C] L.L. 141 (1991).
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suffered; instead of depositors' cash, they received only the bonds while
the government took the money.
Commentators were quick to conclude that the government acted
simply because it faced "a shortage of cash ' 212 and that the action was a
sheer "confiscation. 213 The Argentine Constitution states that "property
is inviolable" and that the "taking of property for public use will be
preceded by legislation and previously compensated. '" 214 "Confiscation"
or any other form of forcible acquisition of private property by the
government is specifically outlawed.1 5 Moreover, the government's
economic powers are entrusted to the Congress.
2 6
Economic emergencies are familiar in Argentina, as are restrictions
on the economic rights of citizens during crisis periods. Several times,
for example, Congress enacted emergency legislation to help some
economically disadvantaged group, such as tenants,217 homeowners,2 8
and consumers.1 9 Typically, the judiciary has upheld these measures as
being important to the public interest in a time of emergency.22°
When presented with President Menem's bank savings decree in the
Peralta case, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it could
not simply rely on precedent; each of the earlier economic emergencies
had prompted legislation, which had subsequently caused the hardship
complained of in the lawsuit before the Court. Instead, after announcing
that the doctrine of separation of powers should not be construed to
"cause[] a total disruption of the State," 21 the Court determined that it
would not permit the "technicality" of the form and author of the decree
to work "to the detriment of unity
2 2 of the government.223
212. Id. at 165.
213. German J. Bidart Campos, El Fallo de la Corte Sobre el Plan Bonex [The Court's
Decision on the Bonex Plan], 7726 E.D. (1991).
214. CONST. ARG. art. 17.
215. Id.
216. Id. arts. 67(2), (4), (10).
217. Act 11,157, 1920-1940 A.D.L.A. 79 (1922).
218. Act 11,741, 1920-1940 A.D.L.A. 486 (1933).
219. Act 20.680 of June 20, 1974, XXXIV-C A.D.L.A. 2006 (1974).
220. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 5, 1934 (Avico v. de la Pesa), Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n [National Supreme Court of Justice], 172 Fallos 21 (Arg.).
221. Peralta, Luis y otro c/Estado Nacional [Ministerio de Economia y Banco Central]
[Peralta, Luis and another c/National State [Economic Ministry and Central Bank]], [ 199 1-C]
L.L. 176 (1990) (Arg.).
222. Id.
223. Justice Oyhanarte concurred and said that the presidential decree had the same
status as a congressional statute, being signed by the Executive for reasons of "necessity and
urgency.... In matters like these substance must prevail over forms." [1991-C] L.L. at 140,
187. See Bianchi, supra note 191, at n.40.
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The Court held that, during an economic crisis, the president is
empowered to assume duties entrusted to the Congress, so long as the
Congress does not affirmatively object.224 The Court's decision reflects
the dangers of a relativist view of emergency powers. Purporting to rely
on an earlier challenge to a presidential decree responding to an eco-
nomic emergency,225 where Congress ratified the president's actions by
statute prior to decision (thus rendering the case moot), the Peralta
Court held that the decree is valid so long as Congress, having notice of
the decree, "has not adopted a contrary decision" or "has not rejected its
terms. '26 The Court argued that Congress still had the final decision on
such matters, that it had not rejected the decree, and that it had in fact
given the decree "tacit" approval by mentioning it in subsequent legisla-
tion. 22' Thus, congressional silence was equated with the affirmative
enactment of a statute. Once this separation of powers question was
resolved, the Court held that the emergency conditions permitted a
reasonable interference with property rights, relying on the U.S.
Supreme Court's Blaisdell decision.228
In this instance, the Argentine Congress failed to "prevent power
from slipping through its fingers." '29 Congressional acquiescence has in
fact empowered the executive branch, whether or not inferring congres-
sional authorization from inaction makes for good constitutional law.
B. United States, 1890-Present
1. The Rise of Inherent Emergency Powers
President Theodore Roosevelt was the first presidential spokesman
for the expansive view of emergency power:
Occasionally great national crises arise which call for immediate
and vigorous executive action, and in such cases it is the duty of
the President to act upon the theory that he is the steward of the
224. Peralta, [1991-C] L.L. at 178.
225. Porcelli v. Banco de la Naci6n Argentina [Porcelli v. Argentine National Bank], 312
Fallos 555 (1989) (Arg.).
226. Peralta, [1991-C] L.L. at 178.
227. See Act 23.871, art. 16, L A.D.L.A 3718 (1990).
228. Peralta, [1991-C] L.L. at 181; Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
229. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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people. ... [The President has the] legal right to do whatever the
needs of the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws
explicitly forbid him to do it.
21
Two seminal events, one before and one after Roosevelt, signalled and
themselves furthered the emerging relativist theory of presidential emer-
gency powers.
David Neagle was a U.S. marshal who had been assigned by the
Attorney General to protect Supreme Court Justice Field while Field
was travelling on circuit in California. Neagle killed David Terry, a
disappointed litigant who attempted physically to attack Field. Arrested
by California authorities and charged with murder, Neagle sought habeas
corpus relief from a federal court on the ground that he had been im-
prisoned for performing his duties in pursuance of a law of the United
States. In the Supreme Court, it was hardly surprising that the justices
vindicated the efforts of Neagle to save Justice Field's life.231 Although
there was no federal statute authorizing bodyguard activities, the duty
was implicit in a general statute giving federal marshals the same pow-
ers in executing federal laws as are enjoyed by state sheriffs in execut-
ing state laws. Since a California sheriff would have been obligated to
protect Justice Field, the same duty was inferred to Neagle.
It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to say that the president's
duty to enforce the laws reaches beyond positive law to include "the
rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the Constitution[." 232 The Court implied that the
president could have ordered the protection of Justice Field without
statutory authority. In practical effect, the Neagle Court recognized an
emergency lawmaking power in the president.
Five years later, a strike by the American Railway Union against the
Pullman company obstructed interstate transportation and the delivery of
mail on railroad cars operating in the Chicago area. After being in-
formed that Eugene Debs, the leader of the union, and other labor
officials failed to obey an injunction obtained on the President's orders
by the Attorney General prohibiting conduct which interfered with inter-
state transportation, President Cleveland ordered federal troops into
Chicago to restore order. Debs and others were arrested and charged
230. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 551-53
(1913).
231. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). What is surprising is that two Justices, including
the Chief Justice, dissented.
232. Id. at 64.
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with disobeying the injunction and were sentenced to prison terms. On
appeal, Debs unsuccessfully challenged the President's authority to sue
to enjoin the strike.233 The Court said:
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any
part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers
and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its
care. The strong arm of the national government may be put forth
to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate com-
merce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises,
the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the
Nation to compel obedience to its laws....
[I]t is more to the praise than to the blame of the government, that,
instead of determining for itself questions of right and wrong on
the part of these petitioners and their associates and enforcing that
determination by the club of the policeman and the bayonet of the
soldier, it submitted all those questions to the peaceful determina-
234tion of judicial tribunals....
Once federal troops arrived in Chicago, commanding General Nelson
Miles ordered his 10,000 men to run the railroads. The confrontations
that ensued resulted in thirteen deaths and over fifty injuries. Even
though Miles viewed the workers as insurgents rather than citizens on a
labor strike, President Cleveland put Chicago under virtual martial law
and put Miles in charge.23 5
With the arrival of World War I, emergency measures were once
again necessary. In contrast to Lincoln, however, President Wilson
acquired his vast emergency powers by statute and, instead of acting in
the absence of or in spite of Congress as Lincoln had, Wilson cooperat-
ed with Congress.236 Yet World War I also brought with it the "concept
of a continuing war with an internal enemy composed of civilians who
could no longer be trusted, even in peacetime. 237 Sparked by the
233. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
234. Id. at 582-83. The current vitality of the dictum is doubtful. See FRANCIS D.
WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWERS OF CON-
GRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 171-75 (2d ed. 1989).
235. Miles likely violated the Posse Comitatus Act, supra note 119.
236. RossITER, supra note 108, at 241-42. Statutes permitted the president to take over
the railroads, water systems, and ship-building facilities, to regulate and forbid exports, to
raise an army through a draft, to set transportation priorities, to control the conduct of aliens,
to reorganize executive agencies, and to censor communications to and from foreign coun-
tries. Id. at 243.
237. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 178.
[Vol. 15:1
Presidential Systems in Stress
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the eventual urging by the Bolshevik
leaders that workers everywhere revolt against capitalism and in favor of
a socialist state, the U.S. Military Intelligence Division (MID) developed
Emergency Plan White, a contingency plan for a war at home.238 MID
believed that the radical labor movement was allying itself with foreign
ethnic groups sympathetic to the Russian revolution.
Although the end of the war implied to most Americans that groups
such as the MID would be disbanded, executive branch officials per-
suaded Congress to continue funding MID at a reduced level. After
racial violence erupted in Washington, D.C. and Chicago in 1919,
Congress determined that "radicals" caused the unrest and permitted
expanded MID domestic activities.2 39 Fueled by continuing labor strikes
and related violence, 24 the MID began to issue "weekly situation re-
ports" in which it gathered and presented information about dissident
groups. As delusions about an imminent attempt to overthrow the gov-
ernment continued to guide army intelligence and the thinking of new
Assistant Attorney General J. Edgar Hoover, MID engaged in raids on
suspected radical groups and continued surveillance of a wide array of
citizens. 241
With the Great Depression and the eventual election of President
Franklin Roosevelt, a virtual revolutionary expansion of presidential
emergency powers occurred. In part, Roosevelt benefitted from broad
delegations of authority from Congress, endorsed by the courts. In part,
he acted on his own when, in his words, "unprecedented demand and
need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure" 242 from the
Constitution. In the first 100 days of his presidency, President Roosevelt
issued the second emergency proclamation in the nation's history, in
which he closed the banks and stopped all financial transactions.243
238. Id. at 178-79.
239. Id. at 185.
240. See BENNETT M. RICH, THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLIC DISORDERS 210 (1941)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)).
241. See JENSEN, supra note 90, at 191-97. In 1921, after Congress officially declared
the war at an end, General Pershing became the new head of MID and, within a few months,
he rescinded all orders allowing army surveillance of civilians and turned over all law
enforcement to the Justice Department. MID's name was changed to G-2 and, although its
formal role in surveillance ended, abuses continued, kept underground out of concern for
public sentiment. G-2 still reported on alleged communists and activities of labor groups,
while it maintained Emergency Plan White. Id. at 198-207.
242. Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (1938).
243. Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933).
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Congress ratified the President's emergency actions within three days, 2"
establishing a pattern of executive initiative and legislative acquiescence
that is still the norm today. Although the Supreme Court struck down
two early sweeping delegations to Roosevelt,245 by 1937 the President's
threatened Supreme Court packing, his landslide reelection, and new
personnel on the Court produced a majority willing to endorse emergen-
cy measures.246
2. The Internment of Japanese Americans
When war broke out in Europe in 1939, President Roosevelt gave
no indication that he perceived an inherent power in the Commander-in-
Chief Clause of the Constitution.247 Roosevelt extended military and
economic aid to the Allies only on the basis of statutory authority, and
maneuvered U.S. armed forces for the strategic benefit of the Allies
only in keeping with the traditional discretion accorded the commander-
in-chief.
248
Beginning in mid-1941, Roosevelt adopted a broader interpretation
of his powers. 249 He seized and operated defense plants where strikes
had halted production, 250 and established an Office of Price Administra-
tion which examined proposals for rationing and fixing prices of scarce
resources. Neither of these measures was authorized by statute. Had the
Japanese not "come to the rescue, 25 1 Roosevelt might have provoked a
constitutional confrontation with Congress.
Not surprisingly, racial animus followed the bombing of Pearl
Harbor. However, the clamor for an evacuation program did not begin
until the Japanese scored important military victories in the Pacific.
Then, pressure from agricultural, business, and commercial interests,
particularly in California,252 and parts of the media and government
combined to give impetus to General Dewitt's report to the President,
244. Bank Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1988).
245. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
246. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
247. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
248. Cf. JENSEN, supra note 90, at 212-25.
249. Id.
250. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 245
(1957) [hereinafter CORWIN 1].
251. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 33 (1947) [hereinafter
CORWIN Il].
252. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PjLIC LIFE 69-70 (1982) (describing
then state Attorney General Warren's xenophobia after Pearl Harbor).
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recommending some sort of internment program. 25 On February 19,
1942, within ten weeks of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Presi-
dent Roosevelt issued an executive order conferring on the secretary of
war authority to designate military areas from which any or all persons
might be excluded.254 Eleven days later, General J.L. Dewitt, Command-
ing General of the Western Defense Command, designated California,
Washington, Oregon, and Southern Arizona as military zones and, to
prevent sabotage and espionage, again pursuant to executive order,255
ordered the relocation of persons of Japanese descent residing in these
areas. Under the program, 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, in-
cluding more than 70,000 U.S. citizens, were removed from their homes
and confined in detention camps for periods of up to four years.
Apart from its racial discrimination, the internment of Japanese
Americans abridged "their constitutional rights ... to move about
freely, to live and work where one chooses, to establish and maintain a
home; and the right not to be deprived of these rights except upon an
individual basis and after charges, notice, hearing, fair trial, and all the
procedural requirements of due process.... 256 The most that can be
said for the President's internment program is that Congress ratified it
by statute a few days after it was announced.257 It was, nonetheless, the
President's program, justified then as an exercise of emergency powers
permitted by the Commander-in-Chief Clause. However, there was no
evidence to support the claim that a detention and relocation program
was necessary to prevent the feared sabotage and espionage. 258 Prior to
beginning the round-up of Japanese Americans, the Justice Department
had compiled files on Japanese Americans considered dangerous and, by
February 1942, more than 2,000 Japanese aliens had been taken into
custody.259 While Justice Department hearing boards were reviewing
individual cases and releasing suspects after the charges of disloyalty
were dropped, the Attorney General promised that "[a]t no time ... will
253. See PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES: 1918-1969, at 233-34
(1972).
254. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
255. Exec. Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R. 1123 (1938-1943).
256. See JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 2
(1954).
257. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173.
258. See COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 4-8 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED].
259. MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUA-
TION 232 (1949).
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the government engage in wholesale condemnation of any alien
group.
' 260
Gordon Hirabayashi, an undergraduate student at the University of
Washington, was convicted for ignoring an order to remain in his resi-
dence between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. and to report to a "civilian control
station" prior to leaving a designated military area. In Hirabayashi v.
United States,26' the Court upheld the curfew, concluding that "reason-
ably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our national defense
had ample ground for concluding that they must face the danger of
invasion. 262 Without any independent review of the factual basis for the
judgment that a curfew was necessary or even reasonable, the Court
assumed that the military would not have put a curfew into place unless
it was necessary. Notably, the Court did not find independent presiden-
tial power for the curfew. Instead, Chief Justice Stone emphasized that
the President's order had the support of Congress, albeit after the fact.
Thus, the constitutionality of the curfew had to be determined by pitting
Hirabayashi's rights against the whole of the war powers of the govern-
ment, in a declared war against an enemy which had attacked the United
States.263 Stone also conceded that during a war, "residents having ethnic
affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of dan-
ger''264 than others, thus legitimating racial discrimination by the govern-
ment when national security is perceived to be at risk.
Fred Korematsu was an American citizen who could neither read
nor write Japanese, who had been turned away from service in the U.S.
military on account of ulcers, and who, because he refused to leave the
Caucasian woman he planned to marry, was convicted for remaining in
one of the military zones designated by the commanding general. In the
Supreme Court Korematsu decision,265 Justice Black emphasized that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
,,266 Btte"iigroup" must be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny. But the "rigid
scrutiny" did not include examining whether the threat of sabotage and
260. Id. at 233. If the reader is unpersuaded that the detention and relocation were
conscious discrimination against Japanese Americans and not necessary reactions to an
extreme emergency, consider the five decades of discrimination against Japanese Americans
prior to Pearl Harbor, documented especially in California. See id. at 129-79; see generally
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
261. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
262. Id. at 94.
263. Id. at 91-92.
264. Id. at 101.
265. Korematsu v..United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
266. Id. at 216.
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espionage justified the exclusion program. Thus, exclusion was treated
like curfew by the Court, upheld as reasonable based on the facts exist-
ing at the time the order was issued. "Rigid scrutiny" in theory became
minimal review in fact.
Of the three dissenting justices, Murphy and Jackson concluded that
the exclusion orders were not only unconstitutionally racist, but were
also beyond the constitutional authority of any civil power to implement.
Their view was that only military authority could take such extreme
measures, and then only under a declaration of martial law and a sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus.267 Justice Jackson made his point
eloquently:
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control
at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be success-
ful, rather than legal .... Defense measures will not, and often
should not, be held within the limits that bind civil authority in
peace. No court can require a [military] commander to act as a
reasonable man ... a commander focusing the life of a community
of defense is carrying out a military program; he is not making law
in the sense the courts know that term. He issues orders, and they
may have a certain authority as military commands, although they
may be very bad as constitutional law. But if we cannot confine
military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the
Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient.
268
Indirectly, Justices Murphy and Jackson also chastised the Congress. By
signing on to the executive's program in 1942 with a simple one sen-
tence statute criminalizing violations of the military orders, Congress
effectively permitted the military the luxuries of martial law without a
declaration and, worse, graced the military program with the mantle of
civil authority.269
From the perspective of constitutionalism, the decisions of the Court
in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, and the related efforts of the elected
branches, were abhorrent. There was no evidence to support the claim of
necessity for the program.270 During the six months between Pearl
Harbor and the Exclusion Order, interest in obtaining valuable Japanese
267. See id. at 243-44 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 244.
269. See CORWIN II, supra note 251, at 98. In a third case, Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944), decided the same day as Korematsu, the Court granted habeas corpus relief to a
Japanese American woman whose loyalty had been conceded by the Relocation Authority.
270. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 258, at 4-8.
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properties and general hysteria were certainly on the rise on the west
coast, but a Japanese invasion of the west coast was no more imminent
in May of 1942 than it had been the day after Pearl Harbor. As Corwin
lamented, "[T]he sober fact is that neither on the west coast nor in the
Hawaiian Islands was one single Japanese, citizen or non-citizen, con-
victed of one single act of sabotage or espionage in the entire course of
the war.",27 Nearly all the Japanese American population remained in
detention camps for the duration of the war.272 Thus, one of the most
blatant forms of military rule was not only permitted to stand; it was
given constitutional legitimacy as a reasonable exercise of the presi-
dent's commander-in-chief powers, and of the war powers of Congress
and the president acting in concert, during a wartime emergency.
While Justice Jackson's eloquent dissent captures the dangers of
constitutional relativity in times of emergency, even he fails to accept
the task of judging the military's program by constitutional standards.
Notwithstanding the Court's inability to assess fairly the military neces-
sity for the exclusion program, it was not thereby excused from review-
ing the consistency of the military orders with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
3. Operations CHAOS and COINTELPRO
The National Security Act of 1947273 defined the duties of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) broadly, but in a context of concern
about foreign intelligence. That the activities of the CIA were to be con-
fined to foreign intelligence is supported by the legislative history274 and
the Act's provision that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. 275 In addition, it
was widely understood in 1947 that threats to "internal security" includ-
ed those posed by domestic groups with foreign connections.276
Notwithstanding the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) had assumed the responsibility for internal security investigations
on order from the President, the CIA wasted no time embarking on its
own domestic spying program. The CIA defended its actions in part by
271. CORWIN 11, supra note 251, at 99.
272. See GRODZINS, supra note 259, at 232.
273. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-405 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
274. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS. 136 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT].
275. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988).
276. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 274, at 138.
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reference to another provision in the 1947 Act which charges the direc-
tor of central intelligence with the responsibility of protecting intelli-
gence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.277 Thus,
according to CIA logic, it was permissible to investigate domestic
groups and individuals because of any remote possibility that the activi-
ties of the groups might threaten a CIA installation, recruiter, or contrac-
tor.278 Although it is clear from the 1947 legislative record that the
Agency was to be "virtually excluded from acting within the United
States,"279 domestic surveillance and disruption programs emerged to
serve the political aims of the executive branch.
During the Vietnam War, the CIA mounted an extensive program -
Operation CHAOS - to identify and monitor domestic critics of the
war, ostensibly for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of foreign
influence on the antiwar movement. The Agency compiled computer
files on approximately 7,200 Americans (and from these files, generated
a computerized index of approximately 300,000 names) involved in
antiwar activities, infiltrated organizations, opened mail, collected non-
public information on activists within the United States, and monitored
international phone, telegraph, and radio traffic.
280
Originally established at the request of President Lyndon Johnson in
1967, Operation CHAOS was carried on jointly with the FBI. Although
the project turned up no evidence of foreign involvement in the antiwar
movement, the operation continued into the Nixon presidency, and CIA
agents spied on American citizens at least into 1973.281 As late as 1972,
an internal report prepared by the CIA inspector general expressed
concern
over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the political
views and activities of Americans not known to be or suspected of
being involved in espionage .... [including] prominent persons...
whose comings and goings were not only in the public domain but
for whom allegations of subversion seemed sufficiently nebulous to
raise renewed doubts as to the nature and legitimacy of the
282[]CHAOS program.
277. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1988).
278. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 274, at 138.
279. Id. at 139.
280. See generally COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 131-50 (1975) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER REPORT].
281. See JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY 533-36 (1986). The program was officially
terminated in 1974. ROCKEFELLER REPORT, supra note 280, at 148.
282. RANELAGH, supra note 281, at 534-35 (quoting SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
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However, as former CIA agent John Ranelagh has written, "[t]here was
a feeling ... that Nixon ... wanted to use the agency for partisan
political purposes and that Chaos was an example of the agency
prostituting itself to this end. 283
In a lawsuit which sought damages for CIA violations of constitu-
tional rights and of its charter in conducting Operation CHAOS, the
government admitted that at least some of the plaintiffs were targets of
the activities complained of. But when the plaintiffs sought through
discovery to learn more about the particulars of the CIA actions, the
Agency invoked the state secrets privilege284 to justify withholding the
information, claiming that disclosure would seriously injure the national
security.
2 85
After a cursory review, the courts endorsed the CIA's state secrets
argument. Because no individual could demonstrate a nexus between
government activities and a personal injury without the withheld
materials, the lawsuit was dismissed.28 6 Apart from the fact that the 1947
statute did not authorize CHAOS, the. practical effect of the court's
dismissal was to excuse violations of constitutional rights of citizens
after a bare recitation of some national security consideration.
Congress did not intend to permit a program such as CHAOS. On
the other hand, the executive branch, from President Johnson to Presi-
dent Nixon to CIA officials, when informed of the illegality of their
actions, simply cloaked their actions in more secrecy to avoid exposure.
The judiciary shares the blame for the abuses of emergency powers in
CHAOS. The effect of the Halkin decision is to deny that the judicial
power extends to remedy repeated and extensive violations of the Con-
stitution. The state secrets privilege itself is a judicial construct, created
to shield the courts from questioning national security decisions made
by the executive.287
At about the same time that Operation CHAOS was carried out by
the CIA, the FBI had undertaken COINTELPRO, a program intended
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT -TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT, BOOK III, 705-06 (1976)).
283. Id. at 535.
284. The state secrets privilege is an evidentiary rule which forecloses the discovery of
evidence in litigation where the evidence sought "reasonably could be seen as a threat to the
military or diplomatic interests of the nation." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11
(1953).
285. See Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
286. Id. at 987-88.
287. See generally Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 840 (1989).
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"to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities ' 288 of people
who opposed American involvement in the Vietnam War and people
seeking improvement of civil rights for Black people. Persons involved
in nonviolent political expression were targeted by the program, regard-
less of their involvement in disorders. Among the goals of
COINTELPRO was the prevention of coalitions among Black and New
Left groups. Thus, the FBI sought to create racial animosity between
Blacks and Whites; to interfere with lawful demonstrations; to create
disharmony within groups; and to intimidate the targets of surveil-
lance.289
During COINTELPRO, special security precautions were taken to
avoid public exposure. When the FBI recognized that what it was doing
was unlawful, rather than terminating the abuses, it merely tightened the
security surrounding the program. Examples of FBI activities include the
preparation and distribution of false press releases calculated to tarnish
the reputation of Black leaders and their organizations; the creation and
distribution of a racially inflammatory leaflet, directed to Black activist
groups and falsely attributed to New Left White groups; the infiltration
of demonstrations, and attempts to interfere with them and to assume
leadership roles in the groups and then to foment dissent within the
groups; the conducting of harassing interviews to intimidate politically
active people; and the creation of a bogus student newspaper, urging
students to question the motives of those opposed to the war.29°
The lawsuits spawned by the COINTELPRO 291 operation illustrate
an attempt at a judicial corrective for executive branch abuses of emer-
gency powers. In Hobson,292 after remarking that "[t]he extraordinary
nature of these charges makes this an easy case, 293 the court found
violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of association and
Fifth Amendment right affording protection from emotional distress and
impairment of reputation and earning capacity.294 Yet the court's opinion
leaves ample room for FBI activities where there is some evidence of
288. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985) (quoting memorandum prepared by FBI defendant, C.D. Brennan, to W.C. Sullivan,
IV Joint Appendix at 1742, Hobson (Nos. 82-2159, 82-2160, 82-2221, 82-2226, and 82-
2227)). See generally SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE,
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, FINAL REPORT, S. REP.
No. 755, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1976) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
289. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 11.
290. Id. at 12.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 288-90.
292. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 1.
293. Id. at 27.
294. Id. at 27-29.
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planned espionage or terrorism. If the Bureau has a proper investigative
purpose in addition to an illegitimate goal of subverting expressive
activity, its surveillance might be upheld in another case.295
It was apparently only the availability of critical evidence or lack
thereof which permitted the plaintiffs to prevail in Hobson and caused
them to fail in Halkin. Because the CIA has the easier time justifying a
national security basis for withholding information, the FBI's activities
may be more readily subject to judicial review. Moreover, in addition to
the expense, slow pace, and uncertainty of litigation, damage remedies
may provide little incentive for abusive officials to desist from their
illegal behavior.
The similarities between these illegal surveillance examples and the
Argentine experience are .striking. When courts vindicate an individual
or group harmed by the executive's exercise of emergency powers, the
damages paid are a small price for the maintenance of the government's
discretion. When this occurs, the courts contribute to a dialogue which
only serves further to entrench emergency powers as part of the life of
the nation and its laws. Hobson thus serves in the United States the
same function that Timerman serves in Argentina - while most who
suffer due to executive exercise of emergency powers have no remedy,
the official record says that the occasional abuses were rectified, accord-
ing to law.296
4. The Iran-Contra Affair
297
The Iran-contra affair had its origins in two initially unrelated areas
in which President Ronald Reagan had a deep personal interest - the
plight of U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon, and the efforts of what
Reagan called the "freedom fighters" or the "contras," a guerilla group
fighting to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua.
Although it remains unclear how deeply President Reagan himself
became involved in the operations that eventually erupted in scandal, his
aides took his emotional attachment to the hostages and to the contras
seriously. Between early 1982 and November 1986, when a Beirut daily
295. Id. at 27.
296. See FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE Xiii (1980).
297. Unless otherwise noted, this narrative is drawn from SELECT COMM. ON SECRET
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, U.S. SENATE AND
SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR, SEN. REP. No. 216, iOOTH CONG., IST SESS. (1987) and H.R. REP. No. 433,
IOOTH CONG., IST SESS. (1987) (hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT]; THEODORE DRAPER, A
VERY THIN LINE: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS (1991).
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broke the scandal, a series of covert operations were undertaken, autho-
rized by executive officials, effectively to conduct foreign policy out of
public and congressional view.
In the case of Nicaragua, the Congress initially went along with
Reagan administration requests to fund CIA support for the contras, on
the theory that the funds would be used to interdict arms which were
allegedly being sent through Nicaragua on their way to leftist guerrillas
fighting the government of El Salvador. When it became clear in 1982
that the real mission of the contras and their administration supporters
was to overthrow the Sandinistas, Congress balked at such intervention-
ist tactics and sought to use its appropriations power to facilitate region-
al peace agreements underway in the area. Congress first merely re-
stricted contra aid but, for fiscal year 1985, it cut off aid to the contras
altogether.
The President and his aides sought ways to circumvent the legal
prohibition. When appropriated funds ran low or were insufficient to
achieve desired levels of support for the contras, solicitations of foreign
leaders and wealthy individuals were made on the contras'. behalf. Then,
sometime in late 1985 or early 1986, the secret contra resupply opera-
tion became intertwined with another secret operation in Iran, when
profits from arms sales were diverted to the contras.
The Iranian venture began when U.S. officials approached Iranians
about buying arms for use in Iran's war with Iraq, in return for Iranian
assistance in securing the release of hostages being held in Lebanon.
Arms sales took place in 1985 and 1986 with the cooperation of Israel.
The transfers were undertaken secretly, in violation of the Arms Export
Control Act,298 which forbade arms sales to countries that sponsor
terrorism (Iran was named as such a country by the State Department at
the time) and required .the president to notify Congress of arms ship-
ments.
Congress had provided for covert operations by statute, but it insist-
ed that certain committee members be notified of covert operations
either beforehand or, in rare circumstances, "in a timely fashion. 299
There was not even a pretense of complying with the covert operations
statute in either the Iran or Nicaragua operations.
Although Congress sought to control the kinds of abuses of execu-
tive power that dominated the Iran-contra scandal,"° Congress was far
from blameless in the affair. When the media reported continuing CIA
298. 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
299. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1988).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 297-99.
Fall 19931
Michigan Journal of International Law
activities in Nicaragua after aid was curtailed, Congress failed to investi-
gate and, intentionally or not, it may have signalled to the executive
branch that it was not really concerned about what was happening. 30
Only after the scandal of diverted arms sales profits and arms for hos-
tages was revealed by the Beirut newspaper did Congress take its inves-
tigative responsibilities seriously.
The congressional investigation itself was a circus of mismanage-
ment, poor strategy, and missed opportunities. The investigators focused
more on individual responsibility and morality than on a continuing
pattern of executive circumvention of legislation, and they failed to
recommend reforms that would make a recurrence less likely.302
The failed investigation also prejudiced the efforts to obtain criminal
convictions against those engaged in wrongdoing. The immunized
congressional testimony of Oliver North and John Poindexter and the
attendant publicity was found by courts to have so tainted the later
efforts at prosecuting them as to make it virtually impossible for them to
be convicted.30 3 The congressional investigators were so intent in ques-
tioning North and Poindexter in making out a grand conspiracy, that
they failed to highlight the obstruction of justice and false statement
violations that were occurring all around them.
What the President and his subordinates effectively created in the
Iran-contra affair was a secret government, extralegal and obedient only
to the President. The cabal operated like the royal prerogative described
by Locke and exercised by King George III. In the President's mind, the
emergencies were at hand: hostages needed to be brought home at any
cost, and communism could not gain a foothold in Central America, no
matter what the Congress legislated.
5. The Bush Pardons
Of all the president's powers, the pardon power is perhaps the most
controversial, because it is neither shared nor checked by another
branch. From its monarchical origins in England,3° the pardon power
was given by our framers to the president in an unstable time when it
301. See EUGENE ROSTOW, PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, OR CONSTITUTIONAL MON-
ARCH? 22-23 (1989).
302. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1274-76 (1988).
303. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2235 (1991); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 656 (1992).
304. See MOORE, supra note 198, at 17.
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was thought that the president may be able to employ the pardon as a
means of quelling a rebellion.35 Nonetheless, when the pardon power is
abused, the unavailability of a constitutional counterweight, short of
impeachment, makes the abusive act all the more abhorrent.
The Constitution grants to the president the "power to grant ...
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of im-
peachment. ' '306 Most presidents have granted hundreds of pardons during
their terms in office. A few, including Andrew. Johnson and Jimmy
Carter, have granted blanket amnesties to a class of people. Johnson
granted amnesty for Confederate soldiers after the Civil War, Carter for
draft resisters after the Vietnam War.
Pardons before conviction are apparently constitutional as well,30 7
although they are rarely given. In the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
administrations, only three of 2,314 pardons preceded conviction.3 8
President Ford's pre-conviction pardon of former President Nixon was
thus exceptional.
A pardon is intended to prevent punishment of people who are
innocent of wrongdoing, to correct an injustice.30 9 Normally, therefore,
the criminal justice system should be permitted to run -its course in all
but extraordinary instances; only if the courts have tried and failed to do
justice in an individual case should pardons be considered. A pardon
before trial actually serves to obscure information coming to light that
could justify the pardon.10
After the years of secrecy, deception, and lying to the Congress and
to the public about the Iran-contra affair through the better part of the
Reagan and Bush presidencies, it came as a grave disappointment,
though not a great surprise, that President Bush, with impeccable timing,
chose to issue Christmas eve pardons to six officials indicted for Iran-
305. See id. at 25. Although the Framers recognized that the pardon power they granted
was king-like, they apparently chose to ignore its undemocratic tendencies in favor of what
they saw as its law enforcement benefits.
306. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
307. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 120 (1925). We say "apparently" because the
constitutional text does not decide the issue, and good arguments support a requirement for
conviction before pardon. However, a proposal at the Convention to limit pardons to the
period after conviction was withdrawn after a rebuttal that the power should be unlimited so
that presidents may use the pardon strategically to gain the testimony of accomplices. MOORE,
supra note 198, at 218.
308. See A Pardon For Nixon and Watergate is Back, CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 14, 1974,
at 2458.
309. MOORE, supra note 198, at 212-13.
310. id. at 217-19.
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contra wrongdoing, two of whom had not yet been tried.31' Among those
pardoned was former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger,
whose pending trial on charges that he lied to Congress about his
knowledge of the arms sales to Iran and efforts by other countries to
help underwrite the contras in Nicaragua was expected by some to focus
on President Bush's role in endorsing the secret arms sales to Iran.3t 2
The special prosecutor in the cases, Lawrence E. Walsh, responded to
the pardons this way:
President Bush's pardon ... undermiies the principle that no man
is above the law. It demonstrates that powerful people with pow-
erful allies can commit serious crimes in high office - deliberately
abusing the public trust without consequence .... The Iran-contra
cover-up, which has continued for more than six years, has now
been completed ....
Walsh also hinted that the pardon could be related to Bush's own
role in the scandal. He claimed that Weinberger's hidden notes may
have "forestalled impeachment proceedings against President Reagan, 31 4
and he criticized Bush for "his own misconduct" in failing to turn over
his personal notes taken during the 1986 campaign.3 5 Walsh revealed
for the first time after the pardons that Bush himself was a subject of
his investigation, on the basis of the President's failure to reveal or turn
over relevant notes about Iran-contra.
3 6
President Bush attempted carefully to lay the foundation for his
pardons. In his statement, he analogized the Iran-contra pardons, coming
at the end of the Cold War, to others in U.S. history that have been
granted "when ... wars have ended." Thus, the emergency of war
legitimates the "healing tradition" and the use of pardons "to put bitter-
ness behind us and look to the future. '3 17 His analogues - Madison's
pardon of Lafitte's pirates after the War of 1812, Andrew Johnson's
pardon of Confederate soldiers, and Truman and Carter's amnesties for
war resisters - are pitifully weak. First, the Cold War was neither a
fighting war nor one which invoked emergency conditions in the United
311. David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial;
Prosecutor Assails 'Cover Up', N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
312. Id.
313. Independent Counsel's Statement on the Pardons, quoted in id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at A22.
317. Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992) [hereinafter Proclamation
6518].
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States, at least not in the 1980s. Second, the Iran-contra crimes had
nothing to do with U.S.-Soviet shadow-boxing. Third, none of the
supposedly analogous crimes were attempts to conceal illegal executive
branch conduct from the Congress and the public. The danger of the
executive deciding the justness of its own cause, especially when Con-
gress has legislated to prevent the very actions that were taken, puts
those accused and convicted of Iran-contra crimes in a very different
category. Congress was unable to have a serious policy discussion with
executive officials because it was denied access to critical facts. Most of
those pardoned had concealed information that contradicted what the
administration had earlier told the public.
President Bush created the appearance that he acted to save himself.
Unlike President Ford, whose mistaken pardon of former President
Nixon was at least undertaken by a sitting president who had two years
remaining in office and a reelection campaign to take to the voters, and
who had no complicity in the Watergate scandal that was the undoing of
Nixon, President Bush waited until after the election, in the waning days
of his term, to pardon someone who could have implicated Bush in the
scandal.
Illustrating Nixon's statement that "when the President does it, that
means that it is not illegal, 3 ra President Bush's pardons of the Iran-
contra actors once again signal that government officials may act illegal-
ly if their actions are good for the country. "Good for the country" is, in
this rarefied sense, a judgment made by the executive without regard to
the Constitution or laws.
Iran-contra typifies the contemporary usurpation of power by the
executive branch in the United States and the extent to which executive
claims of emergency effectively provide officials with immunity for
their otherwise illegal conduct. The 1985 and 1986 arms sales to Iran, a
supposed and hoped-for trade for hostages, violated the Arms Export
Control Act, the National Security Act, and the President's own ban on
arming terrorist nations.319 The diversion of profits from the sales to the
Nicaraguan contras was undertaken in the face of a congressional ban on
aiding the contras. 320 Throughout, a group of unelected officials - in
the CIA, the National Security Council, and elsewhere - hired opera-
tives and worked secretly in aid of the President literally to take over
part of the nation's foreign policy machine and use it for ends and
318. See supra text accompanying note 1.
319. See supra text accompanying note 298; IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 297, at
415-16.
320. See supra text accompanying note 297.
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through means expressly made unlawful by the Congress or forbidden
by the Constitution. While the prosecution of these few individuals in a
sense trivialized the scandal by pursuing charges not central to the
wrongdoing,32" ' the pardons are unexcusable efforts further to elevate
executive hegemony over the government and people.
The only constitutional remedy against the President322 for such
abuses in the Iran-contra affair - impeachment - is not realistically
available and is inadequate to protect against a very powerful president.
First, the activities complained of were conducted in secret, and many of
the details were then and some are still not known. Subordinates pro-
tected the President by lying about the facts when asked. An impeach-
ment inquiry may well have failed for lack of information. Second,
President Reagan was a highly popular president in 1986 and 1987,
when the scandal broke. Citizens did not relish the thought of his im-
peachment, at least in part because they did not come to grips with the
complexities of Iran-contra and could not bear the excruciating length
and boredom of the congressional hearings. When Representative Henry
Gonzales introduced six articles of impeachment against Reagan in
1987, his act merited only brief wire service news accounts.323 Nor was
Congress equipped with the institutional will to take on Ronald Reagan,
who perhaps lacked the requisite intent to commit an impeachable
offense in any case.
6. Kidnapping Suspects Abroad
There is a consensus in international law condemning one nation's
violation of the territorial integrity of a friendly neighboring nation.324
Indeed, according to the American Law Institute Restatement of Foreign
Relations (Third),
[i]f a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in
the territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state
is entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation
from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes
321. See Linda Greenhouse, Law Ill-Equipped for Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at
Al.
322. For an argument that the president may be indicted for criminal conduct prior to
impeachment, see Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President
Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7,
22-24 (1992).
323. Id. at D8.
324. See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 18, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 2420, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
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abduction of a person, the state from which the person was
abducted may demand return of the person, and international law
requires that he be returned.325
As recently as 1985, the United States stood firmly by the traditional
rule. When the legal adviser to the State Department was asked at a
congressional hearing about kidnapping suspected terrorists on foreign
soil, he replied:
Can you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we
regard as a terrorist ... ? [H]ow would we feel if some foreign
nation . . . came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in
New York City, or Boston, or Philadelphia, . . . because we re-
fused through normal channels of international, legal communica-
tions, to extradite that individual?
326
In 1989, in the context of discussions of the Bush administration
anti-drug policy, then-Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr
opined that the FBI could legally seize suspects in foreign countries.327
Shortly thereafter, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials offered to
pay a reward for the return of a Mexican doctor accused of taking part
in the brutal torture and murder of a U.S. drug agent. On April 2, 1990,
doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain was abducted from his office in
Guadalajara and delivered to U.S. officials in Texas. After the Mexican
government protested his abduction and Alvarez-Machain challenged the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to try him in violation of the extradition
treaty between Mexico and the United States,328 the trial court and court
of appeals ordered that the murder indictment be dismissed and that
Alvarez-Machain be repatriated to Mexico.
3 29
The Supreme Court reversed.330 The Court admitted that the kidnap-
ping may have been "shocking" and "in violation of general
325. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432
cmt. c (1987).
326. Bill to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government
Employees and Citizens Abroad, 1985: Hearing on S.1373, S.1429, S.1508 Before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., I st
Sess. 63 (1985).
327. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, 1989: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5 (1989).
328. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
329. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
330. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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international law principles." 33' Nonetheless, said the majority, Alvarez-
Machain may be tried for murder in the United States because the
extradition treaty at issue says nothing explicit about the obligation "to
refrain from forcible abductions." 332 The decision of whether to try him
or return him to Mexico is, said the Court, "a matter for the Executive
Branch. '333 Thus, the treaty's extradition provisions - long, detailed,
and solemnly negotiated by U.S. and Mexican diplomats - could
simply be ignored in the interests of executive branch law enforcement
aims. Its terms became merely "optional, 334 as noted by the dissenters.
In this instance, the Court did not invent a legal theory to justify
state kidnapping. It merely upheld what the executive branch said the
law was. State kidnapping makes the United States a "sponsor of vigi-
lante values," according to a leading British weekly.335 The decision
sparked widespread criticism internationally 336 and in the United
States.337 Apart from signalling to the world that consensus on principles
of international law will not be honored by the United States (so that
there is no gain in anyone else playing by the rules either), the Court's
decision legitimated unbridled executive discretion to employ draconian
police tactics.
Ironically, the DEA apparently sought revenge against the wrong
man. After two weeks of testimony in his murder trial, Humberto
Alvarez-Machain was acquitted by a federal judge, who characterized
the case against Alvarez as based on "hunches" and the "wildest specu-
lation. 338
IV. SUMMING UP
A cynic may say that the modem presidency is simply too powerful
to be effectively limited by the laws and institutions of a democracy.339
331. Id. at 2196.
332. Id. at 2193, 2195.
333. Id. at 2196.
334. Id. at 2199.
335. America's Vigilante Values, THE ECONOMIST, June 20, 1992, at 17.
336. David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 49-50; see
also Tim Golden, To Mexico, High Court Sounds Like a Bully, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992,
§ 4, at 3 (discussing Mexican criticism of the decision).
337. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992); Monroe Leigh, Is the President
Above Customary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (1992); Anthony Lewis,
Whatever the King Wants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at E17; Neil A. Lewis, White House
Tries to Quiet Storm Abroad Over Court's Right-to-Kidnap Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1992, at A8.
338. Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992,
at A20.
339. See generally Linz, supra note 7.
[Vol. 15:1
Presidential Systems in Stress
In Argentina, the government now functions essentially by presidential
decrees.34' The Congress and judiciary have been rendered practically
vestigial since the 1930s, as military and civilian executives have as-
sumed ever greater powers, aided, when called upon, by endorsement
from the courts. In the United States, the path to presidential hegemony
has been different, but the bottom line is similar. As presidents begin-
ning with Theodore Roosevelt pressed relativistic claims of constitution-
al emergency powers, the Congress delegated sweeping emergency
powers to the president in hundreds of statutes, so broad in scope that
only rarely have post-World War II presidents had to rely on indepen-
dent executive power to justify emergency actions. Although Congress
sought to impose controls on the executive in the 1970s, after the abuses
of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal,34' those efforts have
either been dismantled or are circumvented by executive branch officials
who behave as though legal restrictions should be ignored if they may
impede obtaining the president's policy goal.342
An illustration of the extent of presidential power in the United
States is provided by one of the executive orders issued during President
Reagan's last months in office. It catalogues his emergency powers: the
use of military personnel in civilian law enforcement, the regulation of
aliens, the imposition of wage and price controls, the control of civilian
transportation, the acquisition and lease of property, and the control of
civilian nuclear plants, all triggered by "any occurrence ... or other
emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national
security of the United States., 343 At the same time, because ever-greater
swaths of governmental power are exercised by the executive branch,
some reformers urge that to reduce conflicts among the branches, the
presidency should be made stronger.3"
In Argentina, a parallel trend is ongoing. Before Menem, only two
presidents since 1930 completed their terms of office. Since 1930, coups
d'etat and de facto government have been the rule, and constitutional
government the exception. Lawless abuses of power, clothed in claims
of legal sanction, culminated in the 1970s in the Videla military
340. President Menem has issued 244 of the 269 emergency decrees issued since 1853.
Don Podesta, Argentine Vote May Become Referendum: Menem Asks Mandate to Seek
Reelection, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at A19.
341. See Lobel, supra note 30, at 1412-18.
342. Id.; see also Koh, supra note 302, at 1305-06; Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon
Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics and National Security Law,
26 INT'L LAW. 715, 734-36 (1992).
343. Exec. Order No. 12,656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,491 (1988).
344. Lobel, supra note 30, at 1421-22.
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government and its Dirty War. Once the nation was returned to civilian
rule following the Dirty War, President Alfonsfn sought in vain to rally
the nation to adhere to constitutional values. 345 Unable to finish his term,
Alfonsfn limped away with the classic Argentine inflationary spiral at its
peak and the economy and public confidence in government at danger-
ous lows. President Menem took bold action, but much of it was of
doubtful constitutionality - the freezing of bank deposits and substitu-
tion of government bonds for currency, the pardons of Dirty War offi-
cers, and the sacking of the Supreme Court.3' Even as Menem moved
to tackle economic problems, Argentine army dissidents revolted and
captured the Argentine army headquarters and four other installations,
before being defeated by loyalist troops.347
Unwilling to concede the futility of law in this area, the remaining
pages of this article offer a set of comparative assessments of presiden-
tial emergency powers in Argentina and the United States. It concludes
by reflecting briefly on reforms that may help reverse the trend toward
lawless executive rule in these two nations.
A. A Comparative Assessment of Presidential Emergency Powers
1. Traditions
Law has played fundamentally different roles in the development of
Argentina and the United States. The political evolution of Argentina
was determined by the power of autocrats and military might. Inherited
Spanish authoritarianism and widespread inattention to rules limiting the
government's power paved the way for the caudillos. In contrast, the
North American colonial revolutionaries of 1776 were legalists, even in
rebellion, and their break from England came only after failed attempts
to claim what they perceived as their legal rights under English law.
This European liberal legal tradition, along with the need to compromise
in the colonies and states in order to defeat common foes and advance
their collective enterprise, effectively steeped the fledgling United States
in a tradition of the rule of law.
Of course, the legal cultures do not by themselves account for the
imperial presidencies in our nations. From the beginning, Argentines
345. PONEMAN, supra note 1I, at 141-47.
346. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Justice Proves Sluggish in Argentine Scandals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1991, at A19 (by decree, President Menem expanded the Supreme Court from five
to nine members, enabling him to appoint six of its members).
347. Shirley Christian, Argentine Army Revolt is Crushed Days Before Planned Bush
Arrival, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at Al.
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have had a fascination with strong leaders. The early yearning, in Martin
Fierro's famous lament, for "a real criollo to set things straight" 348 was
met by Rosas and perhaps resurrected by the "mystifying success of
Per6n and Peronism."
349
The United States lived its first century with a generally more
modest view of the presidency, in part nurtured early on by antipathy
toward the English crown and the modest role played by the federal
government in most spheres of society before the Civil War and Recon-
struction. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, imperial ambitions,
a changing world view, and strong personalities such as Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson,350 transformed the presidency to one in
which inherent power to meet crises became an essential component.
2. The Effect of Presidentialism
From such disparate constitutional foundations, and with so many
cultural, social, and economic differences, the similarities of the two
modern presidencies in their tendencies to assert legal authority to act
outside of normal legal boundaries in emergency conditions appears
incongruous. However, the characteristics of presidential systems may
themselves account for the parallel accretion of executive emergency
power in the nations, and for the concomitant atrophy of the legislative
and judicial branches. These checking institutions and mechanisms have
failed to a varying extent and for different reasons in Argentina and the
United States, but a common cause has been executive disregard for the
limits imposed by law.
3. The State of Existing Controls on the President
Due at least in part to European and Chilean influences, and to a
desire to control the lingering power of the caudillos, Argentina framed
its 1853 Constitution to establish a president as the "supreme head of
the Nation" for six years. Moreover, the constitutional grants of power
to intervene in the provinces and to declare states of siege contributed to
a domineering presidency. Exploiting these open textured constitutional
powers, the modern Argentine leaders, whether elected or de facto, have
enveloped countless unilateral emergency actions in the discourse of
constitutional rationality.
In the United States, the strong legalist tradition has led the Con-
gress and judiciary to combine their efforts in delegating sweeping
348. Quoted in SHUMWAY, supra note 21, at 294.
349. Id.
350. See Lobel, supra note 30, at 1398-99.
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emergency powers to the president, such that relatively few contempo-
rary executive emergency actions have been clothed solely in claims of
unilateral constitutional presidential power. Because the U.S. Constitu-
tion recognizes only a defensive emergency power for the president as
commander-in-chief in responding to an armed attack on the United
States, much of the blame for inadequate controls must be borne by the
Congress and the courts.
4. Common Abuses of Authority: Economic
Emergencies and Pardons
In spite of the differing constitutional and institutional settings for
the exercise of emergency powers, our presidents have demonstrated
some strikingly similar tendencies. For example, in unilaterally decree-
ing economic decisions of major significance to the well-being of the
nation, our presidents have seized steel mills in the face of a labor
dispute; 351' nullified citizens' bank savings in favor of government re-
placement certificates; 352 seized and transferred assets and suspended
private legal claims;353 and traded arms for hostages in violation of
limiting statutes.354
In Argentina, the Menem confiscation of bank assets is but the latest
in a line of lawless and corrupt economic measures.355 In the United
States, although President Truman lost the battle in the Supreme Court
after he seized the steel mills without authority during the Korean War,
the presidency has since won the war for virtually unchecked economic
power, as is revealed by the bold and unrepentant instances of presidents
ignoring statutory restrictions in carrying out favored policies.356
The recent Menem and Bush pardons also reveal the common
effects of an uncontrolled presidency. Both sets of pardons - Menem's
of the Dirty War officers and Bush's of the Iran-contra figures - threat-
ened constitutional values. While the Argentine leader may have more
clearly usurped the written limit of his powers - the congressional
amnesty power and the constitutional prohibition of torture - the idea
351. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10 (describing President Menem's confisca-
tion of bank assets).
353. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 342, at 744 (describing Presidents Carter's and
Reagan's abuses of statutory authority in securing the release of U.S. hostages being held in
Iran).
354. See supra text accompanying note 297 (describing Iran-contra affair hostage
trading).
355. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 165-70.
356. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 342, at 742-50.
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of the rule of law as a check on the executive suffered at least as great
a blow in the United States, where the president's pardon power is not
limited as it arguably is in Argentina.
Indeed, it is the unreviewability of the pardon decision in the United
States which renders President Bush's pardons so dangerous. Although
the Menem pardons were reviewed, the result was predictable, as the
Argentine judiciary has demonstrated scant independence and little
interest in applying constitutional law standards to presidential actions.
The common theme invoked in both pardon messages was the need
to move on, to put the past period of war and national emergency
behind. Each also recognized that the accused were doing what they
thought was best for the nation. While the Argentine President may have
violated explicit constitutional limits in granting his Dirty War pardons,
President Bush abused limits on the pardon power which are equally
important, if less explicit.
Just as Argentine citizens distrust their government and react cyni-
cally to scandals and official corruption, people in the United States
reacted negatively to the Bush pardons, as they have to other recent
scandals. By a two-to-one margin, those polled disapproved of the par-
dons and believed that the "main reason" for his action was "to protect
himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting from his own
role in Iran-contra.
3 57
5. Democratic Institutions and Processes
The strong presidencies in Argentina and the United States have also
served to weaken democracy, albeit in different ways. In Argentina, the
existence of strong political parties and mandatory voting, along with
proportional representation in the legislature, contributes to legislative
stalemate and an inability to present strong opposition to presidential
initiatives.358 Ironically, these strongly democratic features of Argentine
357. Adam Clymer, Bush Criticizes Press Treatment of Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1992, at A16 (quoting a recent Gallup poll); see generally Daniel Schorr, Will Bush Pardon
Himself?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at AI5 (proposing that there is nothing in the Constitu-
tion that would prohibit Bush from pardoning himself). The text of the pardon clause implies
that a president could pardohi himself, given its specific exception barring pardons "in cases
of impeachment." He may not shield himself from Congress, but he could "protect himself
from judicial action." Id. Schorr admitted that such a pardon was unlikely, and that, given
Independent Counsel Walsh's statement that Bush is a subject of investigation, Bush may well
spend some of his first months of retirement before a grand jury. Id.
358. See Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitution-
al Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 152 (1989).
Fall 19931
Michigan Journal of International Law
political life actually undermine democratic government.359
In the United States, a weaker party system, lower levels of electoral
participation, and winner-take-all voting combine to ameliorate the
legislative gridlock suffered in Argentina. Instead of confronting a
hopelessly deadlocked Congress, presidents collect majorities from
outside their party and, through initiative and congressional acquies-
cence, dominate government when they have only minority support
within the Congress.
6. Popular Distrust of Government
In seeking the mantle of the worshipped leader Juan Per6n, Carlos
Sadil Menem dies his hair and flaunts his prominent sideburns, fast cars,
and glamorous women with a flamboyance sure to catch the public's
attention. By early 1992, President Menem had approval ratings of
seventy percent. His economic program reduced foreign debt, obtained
new foreign loans, buoyed the stock market, stemmed inflation, and
spurred foreign investment. All the while, however, Menem was further
weakening the institutions that are capable of checking the misuse of
official power, as he made personal decisions by decree without any
involvement for the Congress, the cabinet, or the Economy Ministry.36'
As concerns about corruption in his government mount, and the econo-
my improves enough to permit the public to focus on something other
than its financial woes, Menem's personal control of the government,
including the Congress and the courts, is an issue of increasing impor-
tance in Argentina.362
Yet the overriding public sentiment may be indifference, even
cynicism. The 1991 trials of those accused of attempting a coup in
December 1990 were not generally attended by the public, apparently
because it was assumed that since many of the accused were pardoned
by Menem in 1989, there would be no justice this time. Moreover,
many apparently feel that if the corruption of the executive branch is
fully exposed and Menem is forced to resign, the loss of another civilian
president will only return Argentina to the uncertainties of military
rule.363
359. Id. at 154.
360. Id. at 152.
361. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentina's President Turns Economics Into Poll Approval,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A20; Don Podesta, Argentine Vote May Become Referendum,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at A19.
362. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentine Chief Suffers Setback as His Senate Candidate
Loses, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A8.
363. See Alma Guillermoprieto, Letter from Buenos Aires, THE NEW YORKER, July 15,
1991, at 64, 71-72.
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In the United States, after the release of the Pentagon Papers uncov-
ered decades of deceit and obfuscation directed by the executive branch
at the Congress and the people, concerning U.S. involvement in South-
east Asia, a hardened disaffection with government developed. When the
Iran-contra affair erupted a decade later, public cynicism was again
fueled, reinforced more recently by the Lavoro Bank and Iraqgate
scandals and President Bush's pardons of six Iran-contra figures.36
B. Constitutional and Institutional Reforms
Constitutional government has been a failure in Argentina. Owing to
a combination of factors - among them the caudillo tradition, lack of a
history of respect for constitutional rule, chronic economic problems,
and the dominance of the military in civilian life - twentieth century
Argentina has stumbled from crisis to crisis. For the most part, laws are
enforced, streets are relatively safe, and the legal community operates
effectively to assist business clients or defend against criminal charges.
The problem is the government's disregard for the Constitution and its
processes.365 It is not that the shortcomings in the Constitution itself
account for the failure of the government to abide by its terms. Instead,
it is simply that no tradition of respect for constitutional values has
developed. Nevertheless, devoting attention to a few glaring structural
problems in the 1853 Constitution may help move Argentina toward a
norm of constitutional government and the rule of law.
First, the six-year presidential term and unfettered presidential power
to appoint high ranking officials have increased executive power. The
framers knew of that tendency; they wanted a strong executive. History
has shown, however, that the longer term and unchecked appointment
power only exacerbate the propensity of presidents to disobey legal
restrictions. The presidential term should be shortened to three or four
years, with a possibility for reelection. 366 The absence of a congressional
364. See Gary Blonston, Federal Government Mired in Era of Investigation, Cmi. TRIL.,
Nov. 26, 1992, at 48.
365. See PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 127-28.
366. An embarrassing defeat for the Radical Party in October 1993 congressional
elections, along with the growing popularity of President Menem, apparently prompted former
President and Radical Party leader Ratl Alfonsfn to agree to support Menem's proposal to
amend the Constitution to permit his immediate reelection to a second term in 1995. Under
the agreement, still subject to the approval of the Radical delegation in Congress, the Consti-
tution would be amended to permit two consecutive four-year terms for the president. (Two-
thirds of the Congress must approve a resolution of constitutional reform for an amendment to
take effect.) In return for their concession on the presidency, the Radicals gained promises
from the Peronists to support constitutional changes that would create a prime minister-like
position of coordinating minister of the cabinet, who would answer to the Congress, and to
support transfer of the power to intervene in the provinces during times of fiscal crisis from
the president to the Congress. Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentine Leader Gains Support to Change
Constitution to Allow 2d Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A5.
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check on important appointments should be replaced by a provision like
the Senate "advice and consent" clause in the U.S. Constitution.367 Cabi-
net members also wield power unaccountably. The Argentine Constitu-
tion requires that all presidential acts and orders be countersigned by a
member of the cabinet.368 At a minimum, such power should not be.
possessed by officials whose appointments are not subject to review by
the Congress.
Second, the state of siege mechanism, even if efficacious in the
abstract,369 should be amended. Initially, a time limit is needed on the
detention of citizens. When detention is extended unreasonably, the right
to due process is violated, even under a lawfully declared state of siege.
In addition, the prohibition against "punishments" and "conviction" has
proven insufficient to prevent indefinite detention, torture, and disap-
pearance. These forms of inhumane treatment are forbidden by the
Constitution even during a state of siege. Thus, the executive power to
control citizens' rights during a state of siege requires more specifica-
tion, and the judges who are charged with reviewing siege abuses must
be protected against becoming targets of ruthless attacks by the govern-
ment.
370
Third, the Constitution has failed to account for the powerful influ-
ence of the military in Argentine society. 37' To a large extent, however,
the military has merely exploited the traditional authoritarian tendencies
of executive rule in Argentina. When the elected representative of the
people failed to abide by constitutional norms himself, it became easier
for de facto powerful groups, such as the military, to influence society
unduly, notwithstanding legal restrictions.372 In the early 1980s, there
were signs that military power would be curtailed. Besides attempting to
bring the Dirty War officers to trial, President Alfonsfn also dismissed
high ranking officers; moved some of the forces out of Buenos Aires;
imposed a requirement that members of the military promise allegiance
to the Constitution; ended military jurisdiction over common crimes
committed by members of the military; transferred much of the military-
industrial complex to civilian control; and limited instances in which
members of the military may claim their military mission as a defense
367. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
368. CONST. ARG. art. 87.
369. See Garro, supra note 47, at 336-37 ("When the emergency situation is truly
serious ... respect for the rule of law does not preclude the adoption of extraordinary
measures.").
370. See id.
371. PONEMAN, supra note 11, at 133.
372. See Nino, supra note 358, at 131.
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to a criminal charges to those cases related to external attacks.373 How-
ever, the Menem pardons and recurring revolts illustrate the wavering
commitment to civilian control of the military.
The antidote to excesses by the executive branches in the two
nations is to strengthen the courts and the congresses. In Argentina,
some progress has been made since 1983, at least in making the aggran-
dizement of executive power an important issue. 374 Even as President
Menem rescues the economy and pardons the Dirty War officers, the
local press and influential Argentine citizens complain about his style of
governing by decree. Official corruption is being policed more and
criminal trials of corrupt officials are proceeding, albeit slowly. 375 Per-
haps the lower profile being shown by the military is merely a function
of the leadership's basic agreement with the way the government is
running the country and its economic program. In any event, if econom-
ic conditions remain stable or improve, there may be momentum for
ever greater return to constitutional values, structures, and processes.
Ironically, the widespread public participation in electoral politics in
Argentina has also exacerbated presidential hegemony and disserved
constitutional government. Compulsory voting was introduced in Ar-
gentina in 1912.376 In each subsequent election, the middle class Radical
Party or the working class Peronist Party has been the only winner.
Conservative elements of society, which had controlled Argentina before
1916, were permanently displaced.377 The two parties have been kept
strong by continuing battles over emotional issues, such as Peronism,
while the winner-take-all presidential elections contributed to the tenden-
cies of the displaced conservative elements to seek (often successfully)
alternative paths to political power. 8
In addition, a proportional representation system in the elected
legislature, combined with the strong political parties in Argentina, has
produced legislative gridlock. While these tendencies are ameliorated in
the United States by weaker party discipline and a different electoral
system, the legislative stalemate in Argentina further weakens its ability
to control the president and to influence public policy. Thus, the highly
participatory and democratic characteristics of Argentine politics actually
373. Id. at 137-38.
374. See Nash, supra note 362, at A8.
375. See Guillermoprieto, supra note 363, at 71-72; see also Nash, supra note 346, at
A 19 (stating that it could be years before substantial convictions are brought).
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serve to undermine the separation of powers and the ability of the
broadly representative legislature to govern.379
Strengthening the Argentine legislature has been the subject of
serious proposals. Carlos Nino, a law professor and adviser to former
President Alfonsfn, has recommended a move away from presidentialism
and more towards a mixed system of government, "one that combines a
popularly elected president and his cabinet with some parliamentary
responsibility. 380 In a mixed system, the constitution assigns to the
president the power to dissolve the lower legislative chamber, a limited
veto power, and the authority to appoint high-ranking officials, including
a prime minister who becomes (as in parliamentary systems) the chief of
government.3 1 Nino has claimed that such a reform is well-suited to
Argentina and its infamous political and economic cycles. When the
president has majority support in the lower house and among the elec-
torate, the threat of removal of the prime minister assures the president
control over government policies. When the president loses such sup-
port, the legislature becomes dominant as it uses its power to censure
the prime minister in order to control policies and to negotiate with the
president concerning the formation of a new government. In such a
situation, the president is relegated to his official and circumscribed
duties and powers. 2
Reports commissioned by President Alfonsfn proposed Nino's mixed
system in 1982 and 1987.383 Although the Radical Party adopted the
commission proposals, the premature end to Alfonsfn's presidency and
the early successes of President Menem in improving economic condi-
tions in Argentina pushed constitutional reform to a far less prominent
place on the government's agenda.384
In the United States, Supreme Court decisions like Alvarez-Machain,
bungled congressional investigations such as that of the Iran-contra
affair, and presidential behavior like President Bush's pardons of six
379. See id. at 152.
380. Id. at 156.
381. Id. at 157.
382. Id.; see also Linz, supra note 7, at 51-54 (recommending parliamentary reforms).
383. See Consejo para la consolidaci6n de la democracia, reforma constitucional:
dictamen preliminar del consejo para la consolidaci6n de ia democracia [Council for the
consolidation of democracy, constitutional reform: preliminary pronouncement of the council
for the consolidation of democracy] (1986); Consejo para la consolidaci6n de la democracia,
reforma constitucional: segundo dictamen del consejo para la consolidaci6n de la democracia
[Council for the consolidation of democracy, constitutional reform: second pronouncement of
the council for the consolidation of democracy] (1987).
384. Some of the Radical Party reform proposals may soon be implemented as part of a
deal to permit a second consecutive term for President Menem. See Nash, supra note 366.
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Iran-contra operatives, offer little basis for expecting an improvement in
the executive's obedience to law.
The best efforts of the Congress in the 1970s - the War Powers
Resolution, 38 5 the National Emergencies Act,386 and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 387 -, have been dismal
failures in curbing executive branch emergency powers. Presidents have
routinely ignored the War Powers Resolution requirements for consulta-
tion with Congress in advance of committing armed forces in dangerous
deployments, as well as its timetable for removing forces, while simulta-
neously paying the statute lip service and asserting that it is unconstitu-
tional. The National Emergencies Act's requirements for reporting emer-
gency. actions and for congressional oversight have also been largely
ignored by the executive branch, while the IEEPA's delegation to the
president of powers to act in an international economic emergency has
merely provided cover for the president to declare national emergencies,
triggering his statutory powers in situations where no real emergency
388exists.
Congress has been perhaps its own worst enemy concerning enforce-
ment of the War Powers Resolution; neither the House nor the Senate
has taken the president to task for his unilateral introduction of the
nation's armed forces into hostile situations. 389 The courts have also con-
tributed to the failure of the War Powers Resolution,39 ° the National
Emergencies Act, and the IEEPA. A series of judicial decisions has
construed the executive emergency power under the IEEPA broadly,
while holding that congressional oversight attempts to limit the presi-
dent's discretion in defining emergency conditions under the two stat-
utes are unenforceable.39'
The failures of these reforms and the ongoing abuses of emergency
385. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
386. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1601 (1988)).
387. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626
(1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988)).
388. See Lobel, supra note 30, at 1415.
389. See generally Walter Pincus, Senate Authorizes Troops to Somalia, WASH. POST,
Feb. 5, 1993, at AIO. The failure of the president to comply with the consultation require-
ments of the War Powers Resolution before committing forces to Somalia in December 1992,
along with the absence of a congressional reaction to his failure to share that important
decision, may have effectively rendered the War Powers Resolution a dead letter. Id.
390. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984) (challenges to executive action as violative of the War Powers Resolution
are nonjusticiable).
391. See Lobel, supra note 30, at 1416-18.
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powers in recent years indicate that a comprehensive effort, similar to
but more systematic than the 1970s reforms, should be undertaken to
insert effective mechanisms for controlling the exercise of emergency
powers by the executive branch. At one level, the objective is simple: to
restore the traditional relationship between constitutional law and emer-
gency powers. As was the case before the ascendancy of the United
States as a world power in this century, emergency conditions should be
viewed as aberrant, not normal. The occasional need to act with extraor-
dinary powers to combat a serious emergency should be recognized as
exceptional and lawless. Where time permits, extraordinary powers
should be requested from the Congress and actions should be taken only
when authorized. When circumstances do not permit a request for
authorization, the actors should seek ratification of the actions after the
fact.
392
If the traditional dichotomy between emergency and lawfully exer-
cised executive power were reestablished, the nature and scope of the
reform task would also be clear. One set of reforms would come from
the Congress in the form of a revised process for making decisions
about emergency matters. For example, Professor Harold Koh has
proposed a national security "charter" that would provide ways for
Congress and the courts to become more involved in making emergency
decisions which affect the national security.393 Other statutory require-
ments for consultation in advance of executive action, and notification
and reporting of actions taken, could similarly enhance congressional
involvement in 'decisions about emergency conditions and responses.
Another procedural change could involve legislating judicial review in
areas where justiciability doctrines have typically been invoked effec-
tively to foreclose judicial oversight of executive action.394
Although substantive controls could and perhaps should also be
considered - for example, to supply a comprehensive statutory defini-
tion of what constitutes an "emergency" within the meaning of the
National Emergencies Act, the IEEPA, and other statutes which confer
discretion to act in an emergency - the better approach is simply to
392. See FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR,
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 14-15 (1986).
393. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 156-84 (1990).
394. See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1405-19 (1988). The federal courts would be bound to abide by the
statutory directive only to the extent that to do so would not violate the requirement that the
courts decide only "case or controversies" under Article 1II of the Constitution. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
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repeal the grants of discretionary authority in favor of requiring that the
executive seek specific congressional authorization before acting in an
emergency situation. 5 Thus, other than defending against an armed
attack by another nation, the president would be forced either to come to
the Congress before acting in an emergency, or to act lawlessly. Al-
though redrawing the sharp boundary between lawful and lawless execu-
tive conduct could merely encourage ongoing lawless conduct by the
government, 396 the crisisundercurrent of the Cold War which facilitated
executive branch claims of the need to act outside of ordinary limits has
passed. The world may. not actually be a less dangerous place than it
was before the breakup of the Soviet Union, but such claims have been
made by our elected leaders.397 Barring the development of a freshly
minted wartime mindset in our nation, a system which supplies bright
line rules and does not anticipate the need to act with extraordinary
power may work once again.
CONCLUSION
The presidents of Argentina and the United States are institutionally
similar to executive officials generally - they may seize initiative
because they are structured to be able to do so. Legislatures, in contrast,
are constituted to be cumbersome and slow. 398 Yet one of the premises
of the separation of powers and of presidential systems is that critical
policy decisions are vested in the relatively larger deliberative legisla-
tures, in order to gain the benefits of deliberation and to check the
executive's initiative.
Taking their institutional limitations into account, the legislatures of
Argentina and the United States have failed to stop the growth of presi-
dential emergency powers. When they have been capable of focusing on
limiting presidential excesses, the congresses have usually lacked the
political wherewithal to challenge a popular president. When our con-
gresses have risen to the occasion, loopholes in the statutes, their
definitional ambiguities, and presidential challenges in court have gutted
395. For example, the National Emergencies Act could be amended to provide for
executive emergency authority only when the nation has been attacked by another nation or
when the United States has declared war. See Lobel, supra note 30, at 1429 (noting a failed
amendment to this effect proposed by Rep. Drinan in 1975).
396. See id.
397. See President's State of the Union Address, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 170 (Jan.
28, 1992) ("[Clommunism died this year ... America won the cold war .... There are still
threats. But the long, drawn-out dread is over.").
398. See Charles L. Black,. The Workings of the American Political Departments, I
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 17, 20 (1974).
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attempted reforms. Some of these problems are endemic in presidential
systems. Conflict between the executive and the legislature, paralysis of
the legislature, and judicial politics permeate presidential governments.399
These features are especially aggravated in Argentina, where the Con-
gress never developed a power base and the presidency never developed
a respect for the Constitution. In the United States, a tradition of com-
promise, historical experience with elected assemblies, and a unique two
political party system have ameliorated only the extreme manifestations
of these problems.
Our judiciaries have also performed badly. Arguments based on
national security interests and on emergency conditions have trumped
virtually every legal limitation on executive power in the courts; deci-
sions either defer to or affirm executive action taken in the name of the
emergency or national security shibboleth.4 Given the institutional
constraints in finding facts and enforcing decisions, it is tempting to
excuse these shortcomings. However, while the primary institutional
responsibility for checking the president remains with congress, the
courts fail to protect the constitution's separation of powers and individ-
ual rights by declining to measure executive branch actions against
constitutional standards, or do so with the president's thumb on the
scale. While the Argentine judiciary long ago sacrificed its independence
and succumbed to presidential supremacy, its U.S. counterpart has
retained at least the trappings of autonomy and legitimacy, in part by
avoiding battles with the president that it would likely lose."'
Historical experience belies the notion that the United States and its
constitutional law of the presidency should serve as a model for Argen-
tina or any nation. This article has shown that the excesses of executive
branch emergency powers are as apparent, if not as omnipresent and
draconian, in the United States as in Argentina. Argentine reformers
should not look to the U.S. experience for models in solving this vexing
problem. At the same time, would-be reformers in the United States
should take a hard look at Argentina and listen to those who can tell of
its experience with centralized rule and a powerful presidency. Do not
be surprised if the stories sound familiar.
399. See Riggs, supra note 7, at 247, 249.
400. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 342, at 735-36; Snyder, supra note 148, at 512-20.
401. Riggs, supra note 7, at 269.
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